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This essay' fulfills the requirements o f  a dual Master’s degree in Architecture and Cultural Studies 
at the University o f Arizona. Alongside the textual descriptive analyses, I have also created a series o f 
photographic images, which have a curious resonance with my actual daily life experiences in Tehran. The 
images strive to formulate the meaning o f what l call women’s understanding o f public spaces in post­
revolutionary Tehran. AH these photographic works deal on some level with the relationship betM-een 
female corporeality’ and the city’ in the post-revolutionary’ era. In producing these works, I have been 
greatly influenced by writers such as Julia Kristeva, Luce I rigor ay’, and Jacques Lacan, who developed 
psychoanalytical theory’ to explain the connection between mind and psyche and corporeality. The idea is 
to translate my written ideas directly into visual form, following Theodor Adorno's call "... not to forget in 
dreams the present world but to change it by the strength o f an image. " (Dabashi, 2001: Xiii).
A bstract
After the Iranian revolution o f  1979. the Islamic regime o f  Iran strove to Islamicize the
architectural ensemble o f  Tehran in line with the principles o f Islamic fundamentalism. For example, 
the regime changed the facades o f  already-existing buildings by covering them with murals depicting 
the leaders o f  the fundamentalist movement, such as Ayatollah Khomeini, in larger-than-life 
proportions. The major effect o f  these giant iconographies is that they have effectively covered many 
walls in the city, obliterating the original surfaces and creating a "virtual city.” This new city is 
characterized by the ideological gaze o f  the masculine demi-deities looking down upon the populace. 
Not only do the buildings feature the portraits o f  religious leaders but their outer surfaces also contain 
lengthy quotes from the leaders and the Qora’n as well. That is, the regime has assigned to the city a 
new function that traditionally belonged to the mosques. However, the new ideology, while religious 
in orientation, has reduced the social significance o f  the mosques. Whereas formerly people attended 
the mosques in order to say prayers and perform certain rituals, in post-revolutionary Tehran the 
traditional architectural function o f  the mosques has been marginalized. Unlike traditional Islamic 
mosques, which historically contributed to the enrichment o f the Islamic city and the growth o f  
opportunities for public interaction, these pictures consume space. They run from one wall to the next
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and turn the city into the sacred collective body o f  the Muslim leaders. In this sense, social interaction 
among citizens is replaced by one-sided communication between the revolutionary leaders and the 
public. The patriarchal body images o f  religious leaders o f  Iran make it necessary to explore the role 
o f  body and body images in public spaces within the context o f  power and gender relations. 1 he 
relationship among media, representations, cultural and political myths, and commonsense stereotypes 
has been extensively studied elsewhere. This thesis examines how female citizens consciously and 
subconsciously relate to their city vis-a-vis political propaganda images constructed from a masculine 
viewpoint, and discusses how veiled female bodies are conceived as socio-political artifacts within 
these spatial contexts. I will pursue the changing relation o f corporeality and public space in Islamic 
cities in addition to Tehran, and I will compare and contrast this set of relationships with those found 
in a select number o f  American cities, including Los Angeles.
Introduction
Several years ago, as a freshman architecture student in Tehran, I began 
contemplating the idea of writing this paper while out “walking the city." There is a 
personal dimension to my argument, since it originates in my memories ol the city from 
childhood and teenage years and also derives from my own understanding of the city as 
a woman.
Although this paper presents a series of descriptions ol the contemporary city of 
Tehran, the particular cultural and political framework within which this research is 
meaningful spans the period from the Islamic revolution of 1979 to the end of the war 
with Iraq in 1988. There are several good reasons why I have chosen this period. The 
overarching reason is the strong ideological grip of Islamic fundamentalism on all 
aspects of political and cultural life throughout this period. In the aftermath of the 
Islamic revolution of Iran and during the years of war with Iraq, Tehran was under air 
attack and suffered from domestic terrorist explosions. During this time, the dominant 
image of Tehran was of a battlefield enclosed by piles of sandbags. For almost a
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decade, exterior facades of buildings brimmed with images of political propaganda 
and revolutionary slogans. (Fig. 1) Since the Iran-Iraq war, the image of Tehran has 
been changing gradually the government still controls the media, doing its best to 
weed out “corrupting'' western influences. But the Internet and satellite dishes are 
beginning to penetrate the Islamic curtain with which the authorities have sought to 
protect Iranian cities (Montaigne. July 1999: 14). Because most of the materials— 
images, maps, etc.—that support the following arguments represent present-day 
Tehran, it is possible to maintain that the image of Tehran conveyed in this paper is 
still dominant in the city, if not central.
▼ Fig 1 Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war (www.lranian.com)
The twentieth century history of Tehran
until the Islamic Revolution of Iran can be
seen as a response to the political, economic,
and cultural challenges of a dominant and
|j|j ! | | i  domineering West. Extremist modernizers 
such as Reza Shah Pahlavi sought to move 
towards total assimilation with the capitalist 
industrialized Western countries, in 
particular the United States. For Reza Shah, as for many other reformers in the Middle 
East, such as Ataturk in Turkey, modernization was associated with Westernization. 
Reza Shah's goal was “to re-build Iran in the image of the West” (Abrahamian, 
1980:124). Under the Shah, as a result of the rapid modernization that took place during 
the fifty-four years of his reign, the structure of the capital city of Tehran came to 
reflect Western urban and architectural design. This style of architecture was inspired
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partly by the Shah’s desire to pursue his father’s goals of modernizing the country and 
bringing it into closer compliance with Western, and specifically American, standards. 
At the same time, however, the city retained many traditional elements, including 
mosques, which remained the only centers of worship. The Shah simultaneously pushed 
the country into the mainstream of Western culture and technology and tried to evoke 
pride in the country’s traditional past.
After the revolution, ideological architects sought to bring a religious basis to the 
architectural ensemble of the city, in line with the return to Islamic fundamentalism. 
They envisioned the construction of mosques and religious buildings in order to revive 
authentic Islamic architecture. In 1981, Dr. Nikravesh, The third Mayor of Tehran, told 
the state media: “The late Imam said urban regulations should conform with Islamic 
teachings and therefore I conclude that a huge budget allocation in Tehran would be in 
keeping with Islamic criteria” (Amiri, 2003:1). This was particularly important because 
mosques in Iran were traditionally associated with political activity. An integral part of 
the Friday service in traditional mosques was the khutbah (sermon). The khutbah was one 
of several ways in which the close relationship between the Moslem ruler and the society 
was expressed. Historically, in times of civil strife or other kinds of political instability, 
there was no quicker way than the khutbah to inform the populace about the identities of 
the true ruler and his accredited deputy. Therefore, as the message evolved, the political 
dimension of the khutbah's function was emphasized. It was particularly important for the 
khatib (speaker) to be clearly visible and audible (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2 Tekiyeh Muaven al-Muluk. Kermanshah. Tile painting representing the religious leader in the mosque, giving
the khutbah. (Chelkowski and Dabashi. 2000: 54)
Following this tradition, the building of mosques for the purpose of reinforcing 
the position of a religious/political leader and of controlling and stabilizing society 
seemed to be a primary task in the early days of the revolution. In facfsomething very 
different happened. Because the war with Iraq had exhausted the state budget, the regime 
could not afford to erectreligious buildings.' Thus, the Islamic revolutionaries and city 
planners resorted to changing the facades of already existing buildings by covering them 
with religious iconography, depicting the leaders of the fundamentalist movement such as 
Khomeini in larger-than-life guise (Fig. 3). 1
1 It can also be understood as a result o f the impact of the so called surface culture that became endemic in 
the postmodern era. For both Jean Baudrillard and Fredric Jameson the ‘surface culture" is associated with 
capitalism that has been witnessed an “emergence o f a new kind o f flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of 
superficiality in the most literal sense” (Jameson. 1995: 1). The kind o f superficial environment created in 
Tehran is similar to those found in capitalist cities; however, unlike a typical capitalist environment which 
has been produced for the consumption o f commodities, the surface environment in Tehran has been 
created for the consumption of state ideology.
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< Fig. 3 A giant mural o f Ayatollahs 
Khomeini and Khamenei aligned with their 
revolutionary quotes. Tehran. Motahhari 
Ave. 2000. photo by the author
These larger-than-life 
icons effectively cover most" of 
the walls in the city, 
obliterating the original 
surfaces and turning the city 
into a “virtual”* 3 mosque. 
Wrapped walls in Tehran can 
be acknowledged through the 
factors that operate not so much as spatial, empirical, and “real" architectural 
manifestations as virtual appearances. Baudrillard's notions may well have something 
to say about how virtual appearances are applicable to post-revolutionary architecture 
in Tehran: " ... there is no more distinction between depth/shadow on the one hand and 
that which is situated above or outside, because there is no more ‘original.’ Surface
' Here is how an American traveler defines Tehran: “From the moment 1 stepped off the plane in Tehran, I 
couldn't escape the images o f the Ayatollah Khomeini and his still living sidekick, the Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. I wasn't afraid or intimidated, because I was used to this kind o f propaganda from 
my trips to Cuba.” (www .Iranian.com)
According to Jean Baudrillard, the French cultural critic, the shift from the real to the “virtual” occurs 
when representation gives way to simulation. Simulation as described by Baudrillard is not a referential 
operation (Baudrillard, 1994:1). Instead, it is the generation by models o f a real without origin or reality: a 
hyperreal. This happens when the signs lose their referents, presenting a place of endless copies that no 
longer allude to any original. One can argue that Tehran is standing on brink o f such a moment, marked 
primarily by the emergence o f a “virtual" space, i.e., the city that is wrapped by media.
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culture has become so endemic and our contact with the phenomenal world so 
permanently mediated that all we have left is an environment of simulation in which 
even warfare appears more real as a signifier than as an actual event....” (Baudrillard, 
1995:25)
Real mosques are still in use in Tehran but not in the traditional sense. Tehran is 
truly a metropolis. In fact, at the same time that the city of Tehran was being turned into a 
large mosque, the function of the original mosques per se was changing. In order to 
control this metropolis, post-revolutionary leaders created murals in place of common 
mosques that had traditionally served as institutions which moralized and controlled 
social deeds. Interestingly, rural areas and small towns remained faithful to the tradition 
of being controlled by their local mosques and were not overtaken by the murals.
In the past, mosques were the central sources of power of Muslim leaders; today, 
however, citizens rarely frequent the mosques in Tehran, having being lured away by 
secular Western thought.4 Illustrated walls displaying the gigantic figures of the 
fundamentalist Muslim leaders along with their wordy quotes are supposed to possess the 
‘aura’5 of authentic and genuine Islamic mosques, and are intended to bring this aura 
onto the streets where citizens now congregate.
4 “Behind closed doors, young Iranians are simply getting on with it, especially in the cities. Across Tehran,
underground rock bands are thriving, just waiting for the day they can come out into the open. And every 
month thousands more Iranians are going online. Today there are 1.75 million Iranians with access to the 
internet, and in five years that figure is expected to be five million. While the internet is a window on the 
world, it is also Iran's leap into free speech. Recently newspapers which the government has closed have 
continued to publish online." (Judah, 2002: www.observer.co.uk)
5 The notion of “aura,” well-known mostly through “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction," was also brought to bear elsewhere on cities and buildings. However, mosques cannot 
simply be incorporated into Benjamin’s account of mechanical reproducibility. This goes back to
7
Though the ideological impact of this program on the architectural ensemble of 
the city and on the ways people relate to spatial settings in Tehran may have not been as 
effective as the revolutionary leaders anticipated, it nevertheless made a significant 
impact on Iranian urban life.
By placing Tehran under the watchful eye of the depicted masculine leaders, 
these ideological wrappings have also masculinized the city. This notion of patriarchal 
public space necessitates an investigation into the relationship of urban space, 
patriarchy/masculinity, and politics in Tehran. In fact, the revolution’s most essential 
impact on the city may not have been the production of new ideological architectural and 
urban structures, but rather the production of new public spaces dictated and dominated 
by political propaganda showing the leading male political and religious figures. Set in 
this context, I provide a personal description based on female experience of the public 
space. I look at how female citizens consciously and subconsciously relate to a city 
wrapped in political propaganda and in images constructed from a masculine viewpoint, 
as well as at how veiled female bodies are conceived as socio-political artifacts within 
urban spatial contexts. I will also bring to bear on my analysis certain western theoretical 
frameworks which deal with the relations of body and space (such as those found in the 
works of Elizabeth Grozs and Luce Irigaray). I will be looking closely at the degree to 
which these theories can transcend cultural differences in order to help shed light on the 
construction of gender and social space in Tehran.
Benjamin’s fascination for the distinct properties and qualities of buildings. Benjamin tends to clarify 
carefully the distinction between real spatial practices and representational ones. Consequently, the 
strategy of transferring the function of the mosques—as religious and political spatial zones—to two- 
dimensional representational objects fails to revive the ‘aura’ of the real mosques.
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Alongside the textual descriptive analyses, I have created a series of photographic 
images, which have a curious resonance with my actual daily experiences in Tehran as I 
strive to express women’s understanding of public spaces in the post-revolutionary 
Tehran. All these photographic works deal on some level with the relationship between 
female corporeality and city in the post-revolutionary era. In producing these works I 
have been greatly influenced by writers such as Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, and Jacques 
Lacan, who developed psychoanalytical theory to explain the connection between mind 
and psyche and corporeality. Furthermore, in some of the most recent philosophical 
achievements found in the works of Gilles Deleuze, Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz, the 
classic mind-body6 dualism is dismantled by new thinking about the body, issues of 
corporeality and finally gendered subjectivity. The idea behind the body images found in 
the following text is to translate my written ideas directly into the form of images. This 
moment of realization creates a kind of strength on the part of this project following 
Theodor Adorno’s view: "... not to forget in dreams the present world but to change it 
by the strength of an image.” (Dabashi, 2001: Xiii)
6 The term is more applicable to Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum"* (I think therefore I am). Cogito ergo 
sum suggests that thinking and awareness o f thought are the real substance o f being, but it also 
celebrates the separation of the mind from the body.
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Ideology and  R e p rese n ta tio n  o f P o w er in th e  C ity
The leaders of post-revolutionary Iran have drawn on numerous symbolic meanings 
to convey the ideological image of their religious leaders. The type of propaganda on 
display in Tehran is not particular to the Islamic regime of Iran.8 For example, in the utterly 
secular atmosphere of post-revolutionary Bolshevik Moscow, similar types of political 
propaganda were displayed on the city's facades. In the post-revolutionary era in the Soviet 
Union, huge pictures of party leaders covered the walls of the city. Lenin was the officially 
recognized deity. “His image was everywhere; in every government office, every classroom, 
and every square. Lenin's bald pates were symbols of the Soviet states...” (Kaiser, 1980:110- 
11). Therefore, “Leaders [such as Lenin and Stalin] appeared [as people] who acted as 
mediators of culture and invariably took up a position above the viewer, ... and knew better 
than others what to teach... what was good and what was bad... and played the role of a priest 
of a new belief to the parishioners of the church of socialist realism.” (Bown, 1991: 13)
According to Peter J. Chelkowski & Hamid Dabashi. most o f these symbolic gestures were those o f the 
Shiites; however, the method o f displaying them was highly derived from Soviet political agendas. 
s Products of mass culture are different from what comes out o f  the popular culture because there are larger 
dominant ideological paradigms that impinge upon products o f  mass culture from above. Andreas Hyssen 
argues that “The hidden subject o f the mass culture debate is precisely the masses'-their political and 
cultural aspirations, their struggles, and their pacifications via cultural institutions” (Hyssen, 1986: 191). 
Similarly, the British cultural critic Stuart Hall regards the meaning o f  signs -objects o f communication—  
as a function of their relations o f power. In fact. Hall approaches the logic o f articulation that fragments 
social relations and subordinates them to political associations. (Hall, 1981: 235)
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In Tehran, streets and public spaces in general were used as stages for the display of 
all sorts of images that reinforced the ideals of revolutionary leaders. The evocation of space 
and the nature of political propaganda in the public spaces of post-revolutionary Tehran also 
share some features with phenomena in other countries in the Middle East. In the early 
twentieth century in the Middle East, one can trace the history of monumental imagery in 
totalitarian regimes such as that of Turkey under Mustafa Kamal Atatiirk. In the 1920s, 
when the national war of independence was won in Turkey, the new “National Architecture” 
and urbanism were highly affected by monumental signs of Atatiirk (Bozdogan, 2001:51). 
These signs were ideologically useful because they truly had the capacity to signify at once 
both tradition and the new. Sibel Bozdogan argues that “when the population’s primary 
allegiance was still more to Islam and the [Ottoman] empire than to the new “nation,” 
Mustafa Kamal must have seen the power of this religious symbolism to make the 
secularizing reforms more palatable.” (Bozdogan, 2001:44)
In the contemporary Middle East, monumental representations of power become 
even more complicated. They go beyond the simple aim of emphasizing a particular 
leader as a representative of modernization, national identity, and independence. Indeed, 
texts and images also engage other factors central to mobilizing new Islamic identities, 
e.g. involving religion as a dominant factor and entrusting a leader with god-like status. 
In his book The Monument on art and monumentality in Iraq, Samir Alkhalil writes that 
“in one of his 1979 speeches, Saddam Hussein claimed to be a ‘descendent of AH’. It 
occurs again in his semi-official biography which published a family tree providing 
‘proof of this claim” (Alkhalil, 1991:13). Moreover, in one of Baghdad’s museums the 
life-story of Saddam Hussein is told by analogy with that of the Prophet. Such repeated
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and well-calculated strategies have worked to solidify a kind of power in Iraq that is akin 
to religion and to a deliberate establishment of a system of idolatry. In his article “Below 
the Beltway,” in the January 2003 issue of the Washington Post Magazine, Gene 
Weingarten remarks on the system of idolatry in the creation of the portraits of Saddam 
Hussein, regarding it as the creation of a utopian figure on the part of the artist:
Like Warhol, the artists are interrogating our perceptions and prejudices about what 
is art. In declaring their emancipation from traditional notions o f how to depict the 
human face, they question the very nature o f portraiture and its tired trafficking in 
signs o f  frailty, hubris or pain. Instead they seek and find an idea. What results is an 
enthusiastically idealized face, pretematurally calm and in control. This is not about 
what we are, but what we can be. It is artist as Utopian. (Weingarten, 2003: 3)
Since the 1980s under the rule of Saddam Hussein, the embellishment of Baghdad 
has become something of a national obsession. Public monuments in Baghdad mostly 
represent the figure of Saddam Hussein. These monumental urban objects either represent 
him in portraits and body images (Fig. 4). or depict monumental objects that signify his 
physical and emotional power indirectly.
A Fig 4 A giant plywood billboard representing Saddam 
Hussein astride the ancient Babylonian gate of Ishtar. 
(Alkhalil, 1991:53)
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Alkhalil argues that “urban form [in Baghdad] has had to adapt itself around the 
larger of the new edifices... Streets and squares are marked by the presence of such 
artifacts...’’(Alkhalil, 1991:19). As Alkhalil said in a Japanese architectural journal, what 
happened to the urban structure in Baghdad in the 1980s was like the nineteenth-century 
reconstruction of Paris under Haussmann (Alkhalil, 1991: 27). “Between 1979 and 1983, 
architects of the second and third generations of International Architecture gathered in 
Baghdad from all over the world to participate in the reconstruction and reorganization 
projects for the city.... President Saddam Hussein has a clear image of what Baghdad 
should be like in the future....” (Process-Architecture, 1985:17-18) (Fig.5)
A Fig 5 Mutations in the overall urban structures in Baghdad, the Martyrs monument, conceived by the Iraqi artist 
Ismail Fattah. Baghdad. Iraq. 1983 (Alkhalil. 1991: 27)
In spite of being similar to Baghdad in terms of its ideological imagery, Tehran’s 
urban structure in the 1980s took shape in a different way. Streets in Tehran did not have 
to adapt to any large new edifice or symbolic monument. Streets and squares remained 
the same, but they carried new meanings that were applied to them by imposing a new 
skin—the two-dimensional murals that wrapped the walls around and over the streets.
As in Baghdad, images of revolutionary leaders, particularly those of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, made evident their role as representatives of the holy Imams and biblical
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Prophets. This is how Keyhan, the popular government’s right-hand newspaper, on 21 
June 1989 describes Imam Khomeini: “How did Ayatollah Khomeini become an Imam? 
Much like the holy prophet Abraham9, he carried out God’s will, smashed idols, was 
willing to sacrifice his son, rose up against the enemies, and led the oppressed against 
their oppressors” (Abrahamian 1993:13). When comparing and contrasting the two 
different approaches to the application of ideological imagery to urban structures in the 
capital cities of Baghdad and Tehran, it is important to keep several things in mind. The 
leaders of Iran and Iraq aimed not only at restoring religious, political and cultural 
independence to their countries; since the early 1980s they were also engaged in a futile 
war that lasted for almost the entire decade and inflicted huge losses upon the cities of 
both countries, especially the capitals. Strategies o f monumentality in Tehran and 
Baghdad are similar: they both took shape within a strong tradition of two-dimensional 
representation. The prevalence of Islamic symbolism reflects a common prohibition 
against all sorts of three-dimensional artistic representation of natural entities.
Throughout the history of Islam, Muslim artists did not establish a 
correspondence between real spaces and represented ones. Instead, Muslim illustrators 
created false spaces that were folded and flat. This kind of representation has been 
described as theatrical scenery in Mostly Miniatures: An Introduction to Persian Painting 
by Oleg Grabar: “It is an unreal life that prevails everywhere; nothing happens in an 
authentic way and all the humans, animals and buildings are only, in fact, theatre. The 
dead arise and bow to the spectators, and the feast begins. But there is more to it. These 
actors and actresses are themselves immaterial; flat and having no shadows, they are no 
more able really to exist than the events they depict. Thus the whole art of representation
9 Muslims believe that (based on the Koranic texts) it was Adam who built the Ka’bah.
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is created that is two times removed from any possible reality” (Grabar. 2000: 130). 
Elsewhere Grabar notes that buildings represented in paintings were often 
overwhelmingly simplified. They were treated as theatre stages with a few columns or 
sketches of arches (Grabar, 2000:87). Robert Irwin also emphasizes the unrealistic 
features of represented objects in Islamic art by focusing on issues of light and color. 
According to Irwin, typically, no single light source was assumed and consequently there 
was no logical depiction of shadows. Painters were not concerned with the effects that 
might be achieved by highlights. (Irwin, 1997: 196) (Fig. 6)
4 Fig.6 Persian Miniature. A Discussion at the Court o f  
Qadi' (Bihzad: Master of Persian Painting, pg 196)
The same two-dimensional, 
theatrical features now prevail in the 
ideological images of Saddam Hussein in 
Baghdad and those of Ayatollahs in 
Tehran. The erection of two-dimensional
portraits of the Ayatollahs in Tehran 
endowed the city with imagery that was 
far different from the three-dimensional 
monumental statues of pre-revolutionary rulers. In pre-revolutionary Tehran and in other 
large Iranian cities, public spaces were sites for the sculptural symbols of kings and 
rulers. Later, at the time of the revolution, they became sites where monarchical male was 
contested by millions of demonstrators who brought down the statues and re-claimed the
public spaces of the city as their own. (Madanipour. 1998: 43)
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In spite of the similarities between representations of power in Baghdad and 
Tehran, there are also major differences between the ideologies that gave birth to this 
imagery in the two cities. In contrast to Saddam Hussein, whose attitude toward the 
modernization o f Baghdad showed certain similarities to Western methods in city 
planning and architectural design. Ayatollah Khomeini championed an ideal traditionalist 
revival in various cultural spheres. The sphere of urban design was represented by the 
doctrine of the rule of clergy and the spread of religious regulations.
Urban objects in Tehran did not fulfill the democratic potential10 of the Islamic 
city as promised on the eve of the Islamic revolution of Iran. Instead of creating a new 
architecture for new institutions, Islamic revolutionaries and city planners resorted to 
changing the facades of already existing buildings by covering them with religious 
iconography, depicting the leaders of the fundamentalist movement. Instead of 
contributing to the enrichment of the city and enlarging the opportunities for public 
enjoyment, these pictures merely corrupted spatial features. They care little for 
architecture; they ignore and obscure it. The pictures run from one wall to the next, 
turning the city walls into the represented bodies of the Muslim leaders. The walls 
therefore are masked by these bodies, bodies without beginning or end.
As stated earlier, political propaganda in Iran as well as that in most other 
Middle Eastem/Islamic countries shares the political values of traditional Islamic visual 
culture. Since the emergence of Islam, the visual culture has prohibited all three­
10 “The ideas of freedom and constitutionalism featured as major aims of Islamic revolution... [For 
example] addressing journalists on May 15, 1979, Khomeini said: “The press must write what the nation 
wants.” (Menashri, 2001:133) Elsewhere, Khomeini challenged his traditional views with Western 
standards, “ ...They think Islam is like the United States, the larger the size of its domain the better. The 
expansionism of the prophet is different from the expansionism of the rulers. [The rulers] struggle for this 
world... for their own diabolical power, the prophets [on the contrary] intend to humanize a multitude, and 
they whip them to become humans” (Chelkowski &Dabashi, 2000:18).
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dimensional representations of natural entities. It is important to bear in mind that the 
Islamic worldview, as manifested in the arts, also underscores the importance of 
masculinity as the dominant identity in public arenas. In fact, the major goal of those 
who created the propagandist murals in Iran was to create a bridge between the new 
ideologies and traditional belief systems.11 This method was also used as an effective 
tool in Soviet Russia. Russia had a rich tradition of mixing political discourse and 
popular entertainment. The Bolsheviks are deemed the inventors of modem propaganda 
with good reason, yet there was a long tradition behind their practice. Russian 
intellectuals participated in a time-honored tradition of attacking the status quo with 
symbols, since there were few other weapons available; and popular culture, like belles 
lettres, was never alien to political partisanship (Von Geldem and Stites, 1995: xiii). 
Moreover, the use of the poster as a tool of political propaganda—lively in its depiction 
and proclaiming in no uncertain terms the goals of the revolution—helped the early 
Bolshevik leaders to communicate their message throughout the country.
In Tehran political propaganda came into play in different ways. The city’s walls 
reveal several layers of posters and handbills scribbled on, crossed out, written over and 
white washed. In the first stage of the revolution, the propaganda war was fought on the 
surfaces of these walls. The revolutionaries wrote their slogans there, and many 
demonstrators who had been wounded by the bullets of the Shah’s army also wrote
11 The postmodernist trends in world architecture were gaining momentum at about the same time the 
Islamic Revolution was triumphant in Iran, bringing about two motivations which worked in parallel to 
launch a new period in the architecture of Iran. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iranian 
architects attempted to lead Iranian architecture towards an independent identity based on Iran's 
architectural heritage. The other stimulus arose from the greater emphasis postmodern architecture placed 
on the past architectures of nations. These two forces together helped to create works in Iran which 
displayed postmodernist tastes and themes, as well as elements taken from the past architecture of Iran 
(specially the Islamic architecture). (Mirmiraan, 1999:45)
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slogans on the walls with their blood. Soon after the Islamic revolution, the Ministry of 
Islamic Guidance and the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, in conjunction with 
the local municipal government of each city in Iran, began to sponsor all the political 
propaganda and slogans that appeared on the walls of the cities.
In general, the major themes of political murals and posters can be categorized into 
three different groups. The first group deals with martyrdom. Since the beginning of the 
war with Iraq in 1980, the cult and veneration of martyrs and martyrdom led the authorities 
in Tehran to name schools, sport facilities, streets and alleys after martyrs (Chelkowski & 
Dabashi 2001: 125). Images of the martyrs also covered the walls of buildings, alongside 
images of the Ayatollahs. (Fig. 7)
■4 Fig 7 A Mural representing Ayatollah Khomeini and a Martyr from the 
Iran Iraq war. Enghelab Ave.. Tehran, photo by the author
Slogans and graffiti of the second group 
condemned the United States, the former Soviet 
Union, Israel, and Saddam Hussein in particular, as 
the enemies of Islam and Iran. Through propagandist 
images of national flags, as well as other icons of 
these countries such as the Statue of Liberty, the 
White House, and well known symbols of the 
communist state, etc., an official strategy to make Tehran an Islamic city took shape.
Finally, in addition to the graffiti on the walls of major city squares, kitschy 
representations of sacred buildings in the Islamic world (such as the Dome of the Rock) 
bear witness to the Islamic Republic's foreign stance, as well as ideological policies 
toward the Islamic world in general. While the body representations of religious leaders
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in Tehran are all two-dimensional on murals and posters, other kinds of political 
propaganda come into play in three-dimensional forms. The sculpture of the Dome of the 
Rock in the middle of Palestine Square is one example. The changing of the name of the 
Avenue and the circle of Kakh (Palace) to Palestine also emphasizes changes in the 
political identity associated with this part of the city. Before the revolution, the 
headquarters of the Israeli mission were on Kakh Avenue; after the revolution they were 
turned over to the Palestine Liberation Organization. (Fig.8) (Chelkowski & Dabashi, 
2001: 125)
The imagery of political propaganda had to speak a language that was accessible 
to all strata of the population. However, a close reading of these images reveals that 
emotionally accessible realism was pushed aside to make room for abstract and mythical 
features. The images shared features with what I call the Shiite political art and departed 
from the realities of Iranians' everyday life. In the words of Peter Chelkowski and Hamid
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Dabashi,12 most of this was the result of an amalgamation of binary terms: sacred and 
profane, real and represented, present and past (Chelkowski & Dabashi, 2001:277). Such 
binary oppositions, in fact, originated in Shiite political art. An important instance is 
provided in a Shiite traditional ceremony that strongly employs the political use of myth: 
the Muharram procession, associated with theatrical representation of an event that took 
place 1300 years ago at the site of Karbala in Iraq. The Karbala event-a tragically 
unsuccessful battle between Imam Hussein and his fellows and the cruel Muslim rulers of 
the time-has remained at the hub of Shiite collective memory, to be reinvented and 
superimposed on other similar political events. Here is how Peter Brook describes the 
ceremony:
I saw in a remote Iranian village one of the strangest things I have seen in theatre: a 
group of four hundred villagers...sitting under a tree and passing from roars of 
laughter to outright sobbing-although they all knew perfectly well the end of the 
story-as they saw Hussein in danger of being killed, and then fooling his enemies, 
and then being martyred. And when he was martyred, the theatre became a truth- 
there was no difference between past and present. An event that was told as 
remembered happening in history 1300 years ago actually became a reality in that 
moment. (Peter Brook in Chelkowski & Dabashi, 2001: 80)
The distance between Karbala and the real calamities of contemporary Iran is thus 
collapsed in a relentless imaginative contraction of time and place, along with the objects 
of this theatrical ceremony and the audience alike.
2 Peter Chelkowski has been a faculty member o f  NYU as a cultural historian o f the Middle East since 1968. Hamid 
Dabashi is the Hagop Kevorkian Professor o f Iranian Studies, and the director o f  Graduate Studies at the Center for 
Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia University. Both come from academic backgrounds that are intensely 
multi-cultural and multi-disciplined. The purpose o f  their book Staging a Revolutionfirst published in 2000, is to 
examine the massive orchestration o f  public myths and collective symbols in the making o f  the Islamic Revolution o f  
1978-9 in Iran and the war with Iraq that followed it between 1980 and 1988.
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▲ Fig. 9-1011 Wall painting o f  K a'ba: Tehran. Billboard o f the holy mausoleum o f  Hussein in Karbala; Tehran, 
Billboard o f  the Dome o f the Rock: Tehran (Chelkowski & Dabashi. 2000: 125-127)
In post-revolutionary Tehran the architectural replication of other sites sacred to 
Islamic memory displaces those buildings from their place of origin to the city's squares 
or walls, thus bearing some similarity to the displacement of the Karbala event in time 
(Fig.9&10&l 1). Tehran as a city becomes an emblem that holds the realities of the 
outside world into itself—an isolated urban site of political propaganda. The program of 
displacing real objects and genuine personalities through a process of misrepresentation 
called for a total reconstruction of Iranian Shiite consciousness, so that Iranians would 
come to consider their homeland superior to that of other Muslims, including the Iraqis. 
Tehran was transformed into a city that could literally encompass sacred Islamic regions 
and buildings from all over the Islamic world. Indeed, in post-revolutionary Tehran, 
transfigured fragments of the icons of the Islamic world at large were made to support the 
national and Islamic identity of Iranians.
Sacred works of architecture such as the holy mausoleum of Imam Hussein in 
Karbala, the Ka bala in Mecca, and the Dome of the Rock in Palestine were dislocated 
and transformed from the places of their origin to various Iranian cities in the form of 
sculptures, images, and icons. Historical events contracted in time and became part and
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parcel of Iranians’ everyday life, reinvented through theatrical ceremonies, religious 
processions, and political slogans.
Political art and propaganda, Khomeini believed, were instrumental in bringing 
Iranians into conformity with their Shiite ideals. He counseled the Minister of Islamic 
Guidance that Shiite propaganda was much more effective than arms in the cultivation of 
revolutionary attitudes (Chelkowski &Dabashi, 2001: 274). Since the nineteenth century 
and in different Iranian revolutionary movements, Shi ism has been the common 
denominator of political culture in Iran. Modem manifestations of Shi ism were, of course, 
not limited to Iran. In Iraq and Lebanon in particular, Shi'ism has played a significant role 
in active and radical political awareness. However, as a political and cultural arena of 
Shi ism for more than 500 years, Iran was the birthplace of the most prominent features of 
this branch of the religion of Islam. “Playing on the doctrinal as well as the popular 
dimensions of Shi ism, the Islamic revolution extended the full metaphysical possibilities 
of the ancestral faith to the furthest comers of radical political life.” (Chelkowski 
&Dabashi, 2001: 22)
In Staging a Revolution Chelkowski and Dabashi explain the importance of the 
relationship between the contemporary ideological system of representation, used in all 
sorts of imagery, and the traditional imagery of Iranian Shiite culture (Fig. 12-13):
Any analogical representation, any system of signs brought together in the space o f 
revolutionary posters, stamps, banknotes, or murals, is a constructed reality. The constellation 
of signs and symbols is put together in order to make a statement. There is nothing accidental 
about such concentrations of imageries. They are brought together to inform, to convene, to 
commit, to move, to mobilize. How is this mobilization actually achieved? The 
communicative power of any symbolic constellation of imageries derives its energy from the 
common repertoire o f the collective cultural memory. The memory is both active and 
acquisitive. From the scattered parts of dormant memories active ingredients of an exuberant 
recollection may be constituted. Images and pictorial rhetoric speak the language o f these 
memories....These pictorial constellations, whether on the small piece of a stamp or on the 
vast span of a mural, are open invitations their observers to participate in a feast of collective
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construction o f  sympathy, apathy, or a range o f oscillating sentiments that fall in betw een.... 
A representation o f  a figure o f  Imam Hussein, a suggestion o f the color red, ...are enough to 
create a universe o f  relentless signification that in every minute o f  its detail recreates the Shi’i 
historical se lf  consciousness....To interpret the image outside o f its historical immediacy, one 
has to think oneself into the collective mind o f  the receiving audience, on a march towards its 
revolutionary goa ls.... Once the cultural and historical network centered around the symbolic 
image is spread and charted out. its multiple and simultaneous meanings and more important 
the possibilities o f  its meaningfulness become self evident. (Chelkowski & Dabashi, 2000: 
39-40)
A Fig. 12 Tekiyeh Muaven al-Muluk. Kermanshah (Chelkowski and Dabashi, 2000: 39. 56. 54)
A Fig. 13 The visual Narrative of the Karbala tragedy (Chelkowski and Dabashi. 2000: 39. 56. 54)
One thing that is absent from the explanations of Chelkowski and Dabashi is that 
contemporary body images can be read in not just one but two ways. As Dabashi and 
Chelkowski articulate in their arguments, one way is to see them through an 
encompassing sense of Shiite culture, artifacts, and metaphor—that is, the 
superimposition of the identity of characters distant in space and time onto contemporary
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living figures. The other way to interpret the representations of bodies, in particular, is to 
see them in a gendered context, something that the authors do not address. As Elizabeth 
Grosz asserts, in order to conceive of bodies, and to understand the possible active 
interrelations between representations of the body, each sex needs to be accorded the 
possibility of a different space-time framework. (Grosz, 1995: 100)
His Nam e, His Body, H is Pow er
Female historical figures in Islam such as Fatima (the daughter of the prophet 
Muhammad) and Zeynab (the daughter of Fatima) have been role models for Shiite 
women throughout history. Fatima is admired mainly for her womanly virtues as 
daughter, wife and mother and also for her courage in protecting the holy ancestry of the 
prophet Mohammed. Zeynab is remembered for her militancy and active participation in 
what she thought to be a just struggle undertaken by her brother. Hussein, to challenge 
the despotism of the caliph who had usurped power. Zeynab showed amazing courage, 
resilience, and eloquence in defending and pursuing his cause (Milani. 1992: 41). 
Contemporary women, however, have few if any opportunities to emulate the perfection 
of these role models. For example, in the Taziyeh procession, which represents the 
Karbala event, all female roles are played by petite male actors who disguise their 
masculinity by means of the veil. Men in Iran, on the contrary, can identify with the holy 
and deified figures in the history of Islam. The martyrs of the Iran-Iraq war seem to
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imitate and symbolize the moral characteristics of Imam Hussein. Ayatollahs, for their 
part, come into stand in place of deities and even the god of Muslims “himself.” Male 
figures are always accorded the possibility of occupying different time-space 
frameworks, whereas women are granted neither the framework of the history of Islam 
nor the framework of their own particular moment.
By the structure of the representation, body images in Tehran deify the Ayatollahs, 
thus participating in the typical displacement of space and time in Shiite culture. 
However, this displacement occurs within the frame of the transformation of human 
beings to the level of deity. In 1977, when revolution became very fashionable, the first 
portraits of Khomeini began to appear, first as badges and then after the revolution as 
huge murals on the facades of the buildings. After Khomeini’s death, his image was 
gradually sanctified. Today, the elements of the Islamic Republic’s ideological 
propaganda are somewhat diversified, but they represent variations on the old ideological 
themes. The regime’s propaganda has achieved spectacular [results?] by using the hero 
cult of the Ayatollahs. This cult is practiced at schools, places of work, and especially in 
all public places.
In both political posters and urban murals, the bodies of revolutionary leaders 
such as Khomeini and Khamenei are usually presented as at least twice as large as the 
entire city with all its citizens (Fig. 14 &15).
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A Fig. 14. 15 from left to right: A Poster o f Ayatollah Khomeini (Chelkowski and Hamid Dahashi, 2000: 121): A 
Poster o f Ayatollah Khomeini (Chelkowski & Dahashi. 2000: 124).
According to these body images, the state and the city exist in a close relationship 
in which the state functions as the central power, located above everything else:
...T he central power o f  the state is hierarchical and constitutes a civil sector; the 
center is not in the middle but on top because (it is) the only way it can recombine 
what it isolates through subordination. (D eleuze and Guattari, in Grosz, 1996: 107)
The gaze of the Ayatollahs is particularly emphasized. The faces of the Ayatollahs in the 
images are directed neither toward the city and the mass of Iranian citizens nor toward 
the sky with its association with an eternal Divine. Instead, the face and the gaze are 
usually directed toward a remote geographical place, which can vary depending on the 
political message. Quotations placed beside the body images typically address Palestine 
as a destiny (ex: ‘‘Palestine is part of Islam" found on the mural seen on fig: 16, 17), 
although the specific site might be Karbala. Jerusalem. Mecca or elsewhere.
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A Fig 16. 17 from left to right: giant murals o f  Ayatollah Khamenei and Khomeini; Tehran. Motahhari Ave. 2000. 
Photo by the author
The gaze therefore creates a kind of “aura** that suggests a new destiny for the 
Iranian population—something that has yet to come. The gaze implies the future of the 
nation and as a result plays an important role in proclaiming the destiny of the society. 
Astrit Schmidt-Burkhart describes the connotations of the gaze and issues of power in 
both religious and social contexts:
The eye, as carrier o f  the gaze, and thus medium o f  nonverbal communication, but 
more as means o f  mutual control, plays constitutive role above all in the formation o f  
social groups...The dialogic glance should be considered a fundamental point in the 
establishment o f  social contacts. Disregarding the rules o f perception in a social 
context, vision becom es a tim eless form o f  socialization, which itself poses the 
question o f  the logic o f  power that results in the rule o f one o f  the senses over the 
others, or o f  the precedential right o f  “free" vision and its instrumentalization for 
ideological, economical, social, or cultural purposes. Even if the civilizing process 
was marked with individual and social “interwoven independences" (Morbert Elias), 
the assumed privilege o f  “free" vision was mostly connected with a hierarchical 
system o f  authority. The overpowering and ubiquitous eye o f  God can be considered 
as a prototype o f  this hegemonic vision. Here optical control is connected with 
mythology. It epitomizes, so to speak, the iconic apriori o f  the modem police state.
(Astrit Schmidt-Burkhart. 2002: 18)
27
◄ Figl8 A Billboard representing the 
Gaze o f Ayatollah Khomeini, www. 
Iranian.com
Representation of the 
Ayatollahs' gaze also evoked a 
religious model in which the 
gaze of Allah was a means of 
control, playing a constitutive 
role in the everyday activities of Muslims. Although it is usually the body that is dominant 
in the overall layout of these huge images, sometimes the entire body shrinks into two big 
eyes-especially those of Khomeini. (Fig. 18)
The compelling gaze, supreme organ of control in Islam, is masculine in gender. 
Allah's gaze is pointedly trained on Muslim women, systematically surveying every aspect 
of the women's bodies. Women must cover their bodies from head to toe when they say 
prayers to God. even when they are alone and in private. The overpowering and ubiquitous 
eye of Allah in Islam signifies his hegemonic presence in space. In post-revolutionary 
Tehran, the optical control of the revolutionary leaders can be tacitly understood within the 
framework of Islamic ideology and it can be more specifically perceived in relation to 
Shiite thought.
Unlike the Sunni belief system, which has always prohibited any representation 
of the face and even the body of sacred figures, Iranian Shiite tradition practiced the re­
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creation of the bodies and faces of the saints in the early nineteenth century13. This 
recreation first developed through what is called "narrative painting,” and was designed 
directly on walls. In narrative paintings and murals, many of the portraits of characters and 
the saints are labeled shabih (impersonator, or likeness of), a term which refers to an actor 
playing a role for which he is designated. The term is used to ensure that the actor does not 
pretend to be the actual saint but is manifestly only the role-player (Chelkowski & Dabashi. 
2001: 58). Most male characters are carefully delineated, while women characters are 
wrapped in a veil, and as a result are faceless. The gazes and the faces of the post­
revolutionary Ayatollahs bear strong similarities to those of the saints found in narrative 
paintings and murals of the Karbala event, with the exception that the gazes and the faces 
of the saints in these paintings are usually directed toward the sky. (Fig. 13, 19)
The existing records of the Karbala event in the year 1737 in Iran reveal that narrative paintings were not 
yet produced at that time. (Chelkowski & Dabashi, 2001: 56)
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In post-revolutionary murals, some calligraphic messages typically appear together 
with the bodily representations of the Ayatollahs. Whether in Persian or in Arabic, the 
revolutionary message makes its first impression through the semiotic qualities of the 
calligraphy with which it is delivered. Arabic calligraphy signifies the “sacred” because it 
is the language of the holy book of Muslims—the Koran. Arabic calligraphy also appears 
on the walls of the majority of the mosques in Iran and elsewhere. To its transposition 
from mosque to mural, the calligraphy sacrifices the image, transferring to the mural 
some of the function as well as the decorative features of the mosque. The prevalence of 
religious inscriptions in Islamic mosques throughout the history of Islam gives Iranians 
familiarity with a certain type of calligraphy imagery. It is possible to discover specific 
models for certain types of imagery. In mosques, structural elements such as walls are 
covered with a series of images in written form (Fig.20). These textual ornaments present 
repetitive words or simple praises of God, names of the Prophet, the Imams, and many 
variants on such themes. This repetitive language, which reminds us of the masculine 
names as well as the name of the "masculine God" of Muslims, makes women encounter 
what is "other" to them. This otherness is still to some extent in play in Tehran because 
the Arabic text that appears on the murals cannot be easily read and understood by the 
majority of the Iranian public. Nevertheless, it creates a sacred field of obedience and 
certitude into which the Iranian “Muslim believer steps, ready to receive further signals 
and indications of what needs to be done” (Chelkowski & Dabashi, 2001:101).
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AFig20. Safavid period. I he Shah Mosque. Calligraphy on an interior wall. Photo by the author 
Chelkowski and Dabashi have astutely described how the spatial connotations
of the Arabic calligraphy found on murals and political posters might be perceived by a 
Muslim believer: “The Muslim observer encounters the calligraphic message in Arabic 
with a sense of awe. respect, and humanity, his guard dropped, his hands loose, and his 
shoes taken off in a sign of utter devotion" (Chelkowski & Dabashi, 2001: 101).
The significance of calligraphic representation is not limited to the murals. 
Textual ornaments in mosques present repetitive words or simple praises of God, names 
of the Prophet, the Imams, and variants on such themes. The post-revolutionary streets of 
Tehran, whose pre-revolutionary names changed after the Ayatollahs came to power.
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played an important role in producing a new identity for the city, similar to that of the 
mosques.
The main urban structure of Tehran after the Islamic revolution can best be 
explained through on account of its unusual growth. Ideological changes in the 
structure and function of public spaces have been the essential strategic means of 
control by the fundamentalist state of Iran since 1979. When a city acquires a gigantic 
scale under a dictatorial state, it becomes necessary to control the unconventional 
behavior of its citizens. There is a clear link between the establishment of structural 
patterns, through streets, main axes, and squares, and the imposing murals, banners, and 
wall-posters in Tehran.
The north-south orientation of Tehran follows the line of the southern slopes of 
the Alborz mountain chain. In addition to this geographic orientation, axiality represents 
the combination of the main elements of the urban structure, and is the result of historical 
power relations. In analyzing the basic urban patterns of Tehran, one can find a possible 
specific historic precedent for axiality: the pattern of intersecting main axes leading to 
four gates on four sides. This pattern is a symbolic model that has survived in collective 
memory throughout history and has been used not only in urban scales but also in smaller 
scale developments (Madanipour, 1998:118). In the original town of Tehran, the north- 
south axis included the bazaar as the center of economy in the south, the mosque as the 
main religious center in the middle, and the royal family’s dwelling palaces as the centers 
of power at the very north. (Fig. 21)
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▼ Figure! I : Main urban structures. Tehran. 1851. drawing by the author.
North: Zone of Political Power►
Center: Zone of Religion/Great Wosqie** &
South: Zone of
The divide between the north as the zone of political power and the south as the 
zone of commerce is highlighted by a central connector that is the mosque. In the original 
citadel of Tehran, religious space also functioned as a joint between the major north- 
south axis and an east-west cross-axis.
In contemporary Tehran, the central north-south axis linking the south to the most 
northern areas is where most of the formal and functional political propaganda are 
revealed. The primary north-south axis can be identified with Vali Asr (meaning the 
resurrection), and the secondary east-west cross-axis can be acknowledged Enghelab 
(meaning “revolution"). The elongated form of the citadel resulted from three sets of 
forces: economic, religious, and state. Major squares that represent zones of political 
power in the city are located along the two main axes where the majority of protests.
33
demonstrations, and annual religious rituals, such as Ta’ziye14, take place. More 
importantly, most of the murals are located in line with these axes. For this axiality one 
can hypothesize that the coincidence of power relations, namely the enduring structure of 
the two old axes of the original citadel, is parallel to the two main contemporary street 
axes.
Before the Islamic revolution, the central vertical axis was in line with the 
newly built administrative institutions and ended at the palaces of the royal family in 
the north. Interestingly, this axis was named after the royal family (Pahlavi) and thus 
associated with monarchy. As mentioned before, today this axis is named after the 
future Imam of the Shiite—Vali Asr. The contemporary axis of Vali Asr is in line with 
the main administrative buildings as they were in the past and extends to the new 
palaces of the fundamentalist politicians of Iran. However, this axis now ends at the 
huge monumental tomb of Khomeini in the south which symbolically represents the 
power of Khomeini’s cult.15 It is also aligned with the road that leads to the city of 
Qom, the location of the main radical religious schools in the country. The east-west 
axis in the pre-revolutionary era was named after Eisenhower and thus indicated a 
secular zone as opposed to the earlier north-south zone, which was in line with the main 
mosque and thus designated a religious power. Today the street is called “Revolution,” 
and is lined up with the important protests zones such as Tehran University and the
14 After the revolution, the function of these traditional rituals and processions was transformed into an 
ideological form to support the aims of the Islamic regime.
15. In her book, Lenin Lives, Nina Tumarkin best explains the importance of the power of a leader after his 
death. Tumarkin argues that a regime that derives its legitimacy from a single ruler risks instability upon 
his death. But if after death that ruler becomes the object of a cult predicated on his continuing living 
power, then that cult can serve as a stabilizing force. This is precisely what happened with Lenin. The cult 
established nationwide upon his death was based on one theme: Lenin Lives! Lenin’s death was not to 
interfere with his continuing leadership of Soviet Russia. (Tumarkin, 1983: 165)
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huge liberty square to the west. A new mosque of Khomeini, located somewhere 
around the intersection of the two main axes, denotes a new political zone that is at the 
same time associated with the worship of a ‘sacred* religious leader. (Fig. 22)
The major avenues and freeways in the north of Tehran have been named after 
famous Ayatollas such as Beheshti, Motahhari, Modarres, Khomeini, and Nuri. These 
names are also most often used for schools, hospitals, parks and stadiums. (Chelkowski 
&Dabashi, 2001: 125)
▼ Figure 22 Ideological urban structures in post- revolutionary Tehran. Original map from http://www.arianews.com. 
schematic drawing by the author
35
In some cases, there is a relationship between streets that are named after 
particular revolutionary leaders and the body images on the facades of the buildings that 
face them. For example, at the beginning of Motahhari Avenue, a dominant image of 
Ayatollah Motaharri catches the eye (Fig. 23). His body, along with his name, becomes 
important when we read the multi-dimensional ideological meanings that are applied to 
the street. 16
E f  —  I <Si~ . H
◄ Fig. 23 A mural o f  Ayatollah Motahhari.
Tehran. Motahhari Ave. 2000. Photo by the author
In his evocative descriptions of 
spatial practices in “Walking in the 
City,” Michel de Certeau writes about 
the names of the streets and their 
meanings with regard to specific 
values and power structures in the city. 
De Certeau believed that the 
names of streets create new meanings for them. “[These names] detach themselves from 
the places they were supposed to define and serve as imaginary meaning points on 
itineraries which, as metaphors they determine for reasons that are foreign to their 
original value but may be recognized ... by passers-by” (De Certeau, 1999:131).
16 With the establishment o f the Islamic Republic, not only were all the names associated with the Pahlavi 
rule changed; even those names which could be associated with a monarchical system in general were 
changed. In order to bring in a new Islamic world-view, themes from Islamic history, as well as individuals 
and heroes from the Islamic revolution and the war against Iraq, lent names to Iranian streets and public 
buildings. In Tehran alone, between the years 1979 and 1987, 302 avenues, forty one squares, thirteen 
freeways, and seventeen parks had their names changed. (Chelkowski & Dabashi, 2001: 120)
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Furthermore, he argues that these names create new functions for spaces and streets that 
are named after them. “A rich determination gives them, by means of a semantic 
rarefaction, the function of articulating a second, poetic geography on top of the 
geography of the literal, forbidden or permitted meaning. They insinuate other routes into 
the functionalist and historical order of movement— “I fill this great empty space with a 
beautiful name.” People are put in motion by the remaining relics of meaning, and 
sometimes by their waste products, the inverted remainders of great ambitions. Things 
that amount to nothing, or almost nothing, symbolize and orient walkers’ steps: names 
that have ceased precisely to be proper” (De Certeau, 1999:132). The names, according to 
De Certeau, make the city a “suspended symbolic order” (De Certeau, 1999:132). De 
Certeau’s analysis may well have something to say about how the renaming of spaces and 
streets functions in present-day Tehran.
The names and the body images of the religious authorities of Iran have featured 
socio-political spatial hierarchies in Tehran. As a result the city has come to lack what is 
theoretically an important aspect of a real Islamic city: its egalitarianism. The forms that 
produce segregation in Tehran are historically variable. In the nineteenth century, for 
example, lower class citizens’ dwelling places were segregated from the elite groups or 
the royal family. Today, however, the major segregation in the city fabric is neither the 
segregation of social classes nor of ethnic groups; rather, it is the segregation of an 
individual from identity. Illustrated walls that contain the gigantic figures of the 
fundamentalist Muslim leaders place the society under the watchful eye of the masculine 
leaders. The aim of those who designed the patriarchal images was to have these murals.
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posters, banners, and other representations function as objects of worship for the Iranian 
public, elevating these leaders to god-like status (fig. 24).
These images work similarly in modern-day Baghdad (1980-2003). Samir 
Alkhalil explains how “Saddam Hussein’s new Baghdad is not merely a run-of-the-mill 
Third World capital.... It is also a collective state of mind which has its gods...” (Alkhalil, 
1991:32). The gods that Alkhalil calls into attention, however, remain obscure in his 
argument. In other words, he never points out how these gods as ideological artifacts may 
be understood by citizens in ways other than just political facts.
▲ Fig. 24 A giant mural o f Ayatollah Khamenei, Tehran, Motahhari Ave. Photo by the author
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Body and Space
There is an immediate relationship between the body and its space, between the 
body’s deployment and its occupation o f  space. Before producing effects in the 
material realm (tools and objects), before producing itself by drawing 
nourishment from that realm, and before reproducing itself by generating other 
bodies. ... body is space and has space: it produces itself in space and it also 
produces that space. (Lefebvre, 1974:170)(Fig.25)
A Fig. 25 "Behind the Masculine W alls'. Photo by the author & M. Gonzales
Regardless of their interrelations with issues of power, ideological artifacts in 
Tehran must be considered important in the production and social constitution of sexual 
orientations in the city—they masculinize the city. As Irigaray asserts, ‘Tn order to make 
it possible to think through and live [sexual] differences, we must reconsider the whole 
problematic of space and time. The transition to a new age requires a change in our 
perception and conception of space-time, the inhabiting of places and of containers, and 
envelopes of identity.” (Irigaray, 1993:7)
As Irigaray mentions, in order to have a better understanding of gendered identity 
in Tehran, it is important to analyze how the body images function symbolically and what 
their role is in shaping the city as a gendered context. It is necessary to redefine the body
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in space—a shift in thinking about gendered-bodies and public spaces in Tehran and in 
some other similar Islamic societies at large. In Rosi Braidotti’s words, the body is an 
interface, a threshold, a field of intersecting material and symbolic forces (Braidotti: 
1994:169).
Indeed, one can make a clear analogy between corporeal beings and space, 
because both body and space are containers. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz best defines 
this notion: “I must have a body; it’s a moral necessity, a 'requirement.' And in the first 
place, I must have a body because an obscure object lives in me” (Leibniz, 1993: 85). 
From a feminist point of view, as Irigaray defines it, women’s bodies also function as 
objects of support and as dwellings for masculine beings:
1 was your house. And when you leave, abandoning this dwelling place, I do not 
know what to do with these walls o f mine... Have 1 ever experienced a skin other 
than the one which you wanted me to dwell within? (Irigaray, 1992:49)
Murals with represented bodies on them in many cities are significant 
components of their respective streets. They are parts of the observed street, important 
images that come into play along with architectural facades. (Fig.26 & 27 & 28)
On the one hand, the body itself is trapped in and influenced by space, and on the 
other hand it creates a site for the operations of power.17 In a cultural framework as well 
as an architectural one, body and space are bound together in profound ways.
17 In order to interpret the situation within the framework of theories on body and space, it is also important 
to acknowledge Nietzsche. In contrast to theories about human existence-in-the-world that take shape 
mainly in the realm of the mind, such as those found in metaphysics, Nietzsche claims that the body is what 
compares and creates identity and that thought is its instrument. Nietzsche claims, “Body I am entirely and 
nothing else; and soul is only something about the body” (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 34). On the 
other hand, according to Deleuze, “Clearly, there is nothing new about the formula of “having a body,” but" 
what is new is that analysis bears upon species, degrees, relations, and variables of possession in order to 
use it to fashion the content or the development of the notion of being.” (Deleuze, 1993: 85)
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Conceivably, there are ways in which we can understand the notion of embodiment in 
space and cities at large. Human interactions, in their very materiality and motility, 
embody the function of the city. The body, real or represented, is an important field on 
which the image of the city can take shape in people's minds.
A Fig 26 from left to right: Manhattan. Soho: Manhattan. Greenwich Village: M anhattan. Time Square. Photos by 
the author
41
A Fig 27 From left to right: Manhattan. 8,h Ave.; M anhattan. Greenwich Village: Manhattan. Greenwich Village: 
Manhattan, l ime Square: Los Angeles. Sunset; M anhattan. Greenwich Village: Tehran. Fatemi Square: Tehran. 
Kurdestan HWY. Photos by the author
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In Tehran the configuration of space and body is related to the way in which 
religious, political, and masculine power is mobilized. Thus, either the space is filled with 
the represented bodies that characterize the city visually and spatially and are brought 
into alignment through a masculine political power, or the bodies' existence enables a 
particular kind of power relation to be achieved by citizens.
The body images of the regime on buildings’ facades are always of males, 
creating an overwhelming sense of paternal oversight of public identity. In this sense, 
male power in Tehran is perpetually at work, culturally shaping the city’s subjects, using
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representation as a tool for the formation of the identity of the sexed subject, of sexual 
differences. One of the complexities of this kind of environmental knowledge informing 
the street is the relation of the body to the power of the gaze. Viewers in Tehran find
themselves in captivity to masculine faces. (Fig. 29 & 30)
m i n  mi n i
A  Fig  29  from left to right: Drawing by the author: Tehran. Mottahari Ave. Photos by the author
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These faces even decide how the perception of the viewer should be directed 
(Fig.22). Covered by the traditional Iranian clerical costume, the represented faces and 
bodies of the revolutionary leaders of Iran constitute a conspicuous public identity for 
these leaders. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the origin of the word “identity” to 
the Latin stem idem, meaning "the same. " Referring to the physical identity of the 
represented bodies on murals in Tehran, in the eyes of voyeurs, body image can be 
shaped as a condition of remaining the same person regardless of the various phases of 
different images of dissimilar individuals. Indeed, a specific public identity is posited by 
these images: elite, male, clerical. These faces and bodies define a singular identity not 
only for the group of those represented but for the architectural ensemble of the city as a 
whole. Since architecture is the first visual evidence of a city's characteristic identity, 
these ideological images have an enormous impact on the ways people understand their
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relationship to the city’s spaces. Female citizens’ psychological bearing is, for instance,
influenced by these images of male figures.
According to Sigmund Freud, the ego is a bodily being and therefore can be
directly associated with issues of sexuality and sexual differences (Freud, 1923:26).
Relying on Freud, Jacques Lacan regards the ego as the significance of the body for the
subject, and for others. Lacanian “mirror stage” theory, with its psychological
counterparts, has been intimately linked to discussions of space found in the works o f
well-known cultural critics such as Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre argues that a mirror is
analogous to social space, with space acting like a mirror by doubling nature, by
mediating different things, by containing and locating bodies, and by providing a position
or place in society (Lefebvre, 1974:251). For both Lacan and Lefebvre, the mirror is the
archetype for all bodily encounters. According to Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage, by
looking at our image in the mirror from very early childhood, we perceive ourselves in
relation to the “other.” Meconmissance, or misrecognition, is Lacan’s term for the notion
of alienation and segregation of self from self. One could argue that the Iranian regime’s
gigantic facades are the mirrors for the citizens, wherein they identify their beings
according to the body of the masculine “other.”
Bodies contemplate one another with eye and gaze. One truly gets the impression 
that every shape in space, every spatial plane, constitutes a mirror and produces a 
mirage effect; that within each body the rest o f the world is reflected....(Lefebvre,
1974: 184)
Tehran is controlled by the male gaze. A young male single citizen defines post­
revolutionary Tehran in these words: “It is worse after the revolution, as there are more 
restrictions on personal freedom and it is as if you are always being watched. You always 
have to have a good excuse for what you do” (Madanipour, 1998: 153). In a certain
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sense, it seems as if the regime's imagery has reduced all citizens to the kind of passivity 
stereotypically associated with the female gender.
Regardless of the technique (the male gaze, the gendering of the citizenry, the 
constitution of individuals in Tehran) women especially will be divided from themselves. 
They will find within themselves little correspondence to the masculinized content of the 
murals. In addition, female citizens remain masked behind the veil, demonstrating how 
outside and in public space. (Fig. 31)
A Fig. 31 “The Absent Body,” Photo by the author & M. Gonzales
In the following discussion, I consider how female citizens relate to public space 
in Tehran. It is not my goal to provide an historical overv iew of how gendered Islamic 
settings came into being; rather. I am interested in looking from a feminist perspective at 
how issues of gender can be raised in connection with contemporary public spaces and 
social interactions in the city. My analysis borrows from the approaches adopted in 
various other disciplines, but makes particular reference to issues of space and 
embodiment in Tehran. My intention is not to look at the veil in its historical context, but
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to step back from its historical and religious connotations and examine it as a secondary 
space for women’s bodies. It is not a question of how the external world sees these 
wrapped bodies in the context of the city, but of how those living bodies see the world 
from behind the shell in which they are meant to reside.
Initially, Rosi Braidotti casts feminist theory as working to overcome a history of 
female disembodiment:
Feminist theory... expresses women’s ... structural need to posit themselves as 
female subjects, that is to say, not as disembodied entities, but rather as corporeal and 
consequently sexed beings....! believe that the definition o f  the female subject starts 
with the revaluation o f  the bodily roots o f subjectivity and the rejection o f  the 
traditional vision o f  the knowing subject as universal, neutral and consequently 
gender-free. This ‘positional’ or situated way o f  seeing the subject is based on the 
understanding that the most important location or situation is the rooting o f  the 
subject into the spatial frame o f  the body. (1994:161)
Veiled women in Iran can be understood as disembodied entities, 
naturalized within the spaces and the society of Tehran.
he Wrapped City and The Wrapped Bodies
A Look at the 20 Century History of the Relations between Women's Body. 
Veil, and Public Space in Iran
In “Confessions in Public Space,” Lynne Breslin argues that since the 
development of new institutions beginning in the late Enlightenment, the private/public 
spatial dichotomy in the west has broken down. As a result, public and private spaces in 
western and westernized cities alike have acquired similar spatial characteristics and have 
even become enmeshed into one. The hospital, school, and prison have been reconfigured 
to assume characteristics and functions of both the private and public realms. Public
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codes of behavior and private impulses often conflict in the daily occupation of public
spaces. In 1904, the New York City subway opened to a week of public celebration of
this newest of civic amenities, but today, living and sleeping are common activities on
subway trains and in stations. The dialectic of private and public allows people of the
west to define themselves simultaneously as individuals, and as public citizens (Lynne
Breslin, 1996: 264). Relying on Foucault, Gilles Deleuze derives sets of relationships
between public and private space within the frame of traditional western disciplinary
society and modem western society. In fact, Deleuze is interested in laying bare the
features of contemporary western social structure by relating them to issues of public and
private. This is how Deleuze describes post World War II western societies:
...since the Second World War we are no longer in disciplinary societies... We’re in 
the midst of a general breakdown of all sites of confinement—prisons, hospitals, 
factories, schools, [and] the family. The family is an “interior” that’s breaking down 
like all other interiors.... (Deleuze, 2002:318)
In some contemporary Islamic cities, however, the division of public/private 
space is still perhaps one of the most important features of spatiality. Interestingly, the 
divisions between public and private spaces have often centered on the female body.In 
fact, although revealed only in the private domestic space, women’s bodies have always 
been central to Iranian political discourse in the construction of public space. Soon after 
Reza Shah came to power at the beginning of the twentieth century, he embarked on his 
quest to give a modernized image to Iranian cities, ordering the removal of the most 
conspicuous sign of backwardness—the veil. In 1983 women were again obliged to re­
veil, signaling the creation of a strong Islamic image for post-revolutionary Iranian cities. 
The use of the veil was not limited to the actual wrapped bodies of women, however.
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Plastered over the facades of buildings, the words hijab or mohajjabbe (veiled woman), 
and the images of faceless veiled bodies of women can still be found today.
In Iran there are links between female corporeality, conceptions of private and 
public space, and government regulations. In post-revolutionary Iranian political thought, 
the ways in which the distinction between the public and the private spheres is drawn 
have served to confine women into typically female spheres of activity like housework 
and nurturance. In both public spaces and the private domain, women’s bodily 
appearance is minimized. These issues have often been considered part of an ideal 
Islamic/moral life. Today, the gendered allocation of space has a sweeping relevance to 
issues of Islamic national identity, and the desire to limit women’s space is not peculiar to 
post-revolutionary Iran. On the Arabian Peninsula, the birthplace of Islam and home to 
such countries as Saudi Arabia, the obligation to preserve traditional Islamic regulations 
such as veiling women in public and maintaining gendered space in architectural and 
urban design is as strict and serious as in post-revolutionary Iran.
Gendered zones are perhaps among the most important features of public and 
private spaces in Islamic cities. However, as Janet Abu-Lughod points out, it is 
important to bear in mind that the rules governing gendered spaces established more 
than just physically distinctive regions; they established visually distinctive or insulated 
regions. The object was not only to prevent physical contact but to protect visual 
privacy as well. Line-of-sight distance, rather than physical distance, was the object of 
urban design. Thus, Islamic law regulated the placement of windows, the heights of 
adjacent buildings and the mutual responsibilities of neighbors toward one another so 
as to guard visual privacy. According to Abu-Lughod, the visual features of spatial
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settings in Islamic architecture are thus as important as these functional aspects (Abu- 
Lughod, 1987:167).
These visual features of spatial settings in Islamic architecture can be 
understood in two different ways when seen from a gender-based perspective: visual 
control and visual privacy. Indeed, visual control imposed by male power on female 
inhabitants creates visual privacy for women. In most Islamic cities, visual privacy can 
be regarded as women’s empowerment within the framework of gendered spatial 
discourse. For example, according to Zeynep Qelik, in traditional houses in the Islamic 
city of Casbah, gender-based turfs prevented physical contact between men and 
women, and enabled visual privacy. The mushrabiyyas were decorated screens, and the 
asymmetrical arrangement of these entrance doors protected the interior of the home 
from the gaze of passersby.
Regardless of the family’s income or the size o f the building, the houses of the 
Casbah closed themselves to the street and turned onto a courtyard surrounded by 
elaborate arcades. The geographic and topographic conditions o f  Algiers added 
another element to the houses o f the Casbah: rooftop terraces. In contrast to the 
internalized courtyards and relatively contrived rooms o f the house, the terraces 
opened up to the neighbors, to the city, to the sea-to  the world. The concern for 
privacy so dominant in defining the street facades, disintegrated at roof level. It was 
this alternative realm that the women o f Algiers claimed for themselves—as a place 
of work, socialization and recreation; indeed a much more pleasant place than the 
restricted streets below. The Casbah thus became divided into two realms: on the top, 
occupying the expanse of the entire city, were the women; at the bottom were the 
narrow streets belonging to men. (Celik, 1996: 130)
According to Qelik, visual aspects of traditional Islamic architecture can be 
understood as a double-sided phenomenon when seen from the point of view of gender 
empowerment. In fact, visual aspects of traditional Islamic architecture create zones of 
power for men in the public realm and produce realms of power for women in the 
private. In spite of the fact that women possessed zones of power in the interior, it is 
important to bear in mind that women’s space is always marginalized space because
51
women are literally secluded from the social discourse. Women who gained power by
virtue of possessing visual privacy in traditional houses were indeed merely passive
spectators who could not participate in public interactions that they witnessed from
behind the screens or on top of the roofs.
Glass screens in Iranian traditional Islamic houses either prohibited or modified
vision, but in either case controlled it. In her book Privacy and Publicity: Modern
Architecture as Mass Media, Beatriz Colomina devotes a section to Le Corbusier’s
description of what he calls “Arab Architecture.” Colomina’s intention is to describe
Corbusier’s experience in the architectural spaces of Arab cities. Like Abu-Lughod, yet
with a slightly different perspective, Colomina highlights the visual aspects of these
spaces, reinforced by the decorated glass screens, through the eyes of Corbusier:
It is a space that is not made o f  walls but o f  images-lmages as walls. Or as Le 
Corbusier puts it, ‘walls of light.’ That is, the walls that define the space are no 
longer solid walls punctuated by small windows but have been dematerialized, 
thinned down with new building technologies and replaced by extended windows, 
lines of glass whose views now define the space. The walls that are not transparent 
now float in the space o f the house rather than produce it.... The window is no longer 
a hole in the wall; it has taken over the wall. And if, as Rasmussen points out, ‘the 
walls give the impression o f being made out o f  papers,’ the big window is a paper 
wall with a picture on it, a picture wall, a (movie) screen. (Colomina, 1994:6)
In the courtyards of Iran as well as those of most Arab countries of the Middle
East, the tendency for privacy as well as the concern for the harsh natural light
conditions in the desert resulted in the creation of colorful glass screens that came into
play in place of walls. A sense of incompleteness fills the exterior envelopes of the
courtyards. In a sense, the barriers in the inside of the house are fragile and only serve
to protect the household from the visual intrusions of passersby, whereas the walls that
divide the main interior of the house from the outside world are thick and invincible
(Fig.28). These features without a doubt influenced Le Corbusier’s design concepts;
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however, Le Corbusier used flat transparent glass screens for his houses. As a result the 
so-called ‘walls of light’ were not used by Corbusier in their real Islamic functional 
context—that of visual control.
My purpose in investigating gendered space in contemporary Tehran is to depart 
from the standard oriental view of two mutually exclusive and hierarchically placed 
categories: the male public realm of the city and the female private realm of the home, 
the most pervasive gendered ideology in Islam. According to this framework, 
traditional courtyards in Islamic houses are, for example, seen as structures built to 
seclude women from the outside. Openings in the architectural envelope of the home 
are limited for similar reasons. Here is the French travel writer Lane Poole’s description 
of an Egyptian house in the nineteenth century:"... Here is no sign of life; the doors are 
jealously closed, the windows shrouded....Women’s apartments are carefully shut off 
from the court” (Poole, 1902:12-17). Most of these oriental views toward gendered 
space in Islamic settings are bound up with the male/female binary. However, the 
construction of this boundary is made more complex by the fact that architectural 
patterns were designed to create both visual and physical control.
In “Islamic City—Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary 
Relevance,” Janet Abu-Lughod, the most persuasive contemporary critic of gendered 
settings in Islam, attempts to depart from such Orientalist perspectives. In attempting 
to “deconstruct thinking about the Islamic city,” she maintains that Islam along with 
other features (such as central political power, social structure, class divisions, local 
traditions and environmental aspects of various Islamic countries) was an important 
factor of urban design:
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To say that Islam was not the only cause of urban form is not to say that it was 
unimportant. On the contrary, it was a crucial contributing factor in shaping cities 
within its realms. It contributed in several important ways....By encouraging gender 
segregation, Islam created a set of architectural and spatial imperatives that had only 
a limited range of solutions... This structuring of space was different from what 
would have prevailed had freer mixing of males and females been the pattern. Many 
spatial divisions were a functional supplement to alternative patterns o f person­
marking which were also used but often not fully satisfactory.... (Abu-Lughod, 
1987:163)
Abu-Lughod believes that this gendered model does, in fact, still exist in
contemporary Muslim Arab-cities. She argues that the older binary pattern (male/female)
of the city building has been maintained in many sections of “Arabo-Islamic” cities even
today because it is still well adapted to the complex demands for visual privacy for
women, in effect locking them in and turning them into passive spectators. She further
opens up this argument by illustrating her own experience in public and private spaces in
“Arab cities.” She maintains “how easy it is to tell whether I am in public space or have
blundered into semi-private space” (Abu-Lughod, 1987:169). Interestingly, she declares
that she has often tried to identify the markers that indicate this:
A sudden narrowing of a path, particularly if that narrowing has been exaggerated by 
the implanting of low stone posts or even a pile of bricks, is a sign of the shift, 
especially when the road widens again soon afterwards. But even when the spatial 
semiotics is absent, the personal ones are present. There is the questioning look or the 
approach o f someone wanting to help but clearly also wanting to know. (Abu- 
Lughod, 1987:169)
Abu-Lughod's provocative investigation into what she calls ‘Vfra&o-Islamic 
cities” reminds us of the persistence of a gendered cultural tradition in Islamic cities. 
Nevertheless, Abu-Lughod fails to look at some important urban complexities in the 
Middle East that, despite their resistance to Islamic tradition, are the result of other local
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effects,18 such as the nationalist passion in Iraq and the Islamic revolution in Iran. 
Traditional aspects of Islamic culture (including Islamic architecture and urbanism) in 
these countries possess a decisive political stamp—they shift from their historical stage to 
those of exhibitionary tools caught up in the political and institutional frameworks.
Post-revolutionary Tehran, with its emphasis on the creation of new spaces 
adhering to a new visuality, bears a strong similarity to Abu-Lughod’s representatives 
of the visual features of an Islamic city. For this reason it's an important setting within 
which to investigate issues of gender and space in the Middle East from a contemporary 
feminist perspective.
At the beginning of the Islamic revolution in Iran, traditional aspects of Islamic
culture came into play as weapons for Islam’s emancipation, but as a medium of
propaganda independent of authentic traditional and religious contexts. For example, the
image of the veiled women in Iran was abused for political purposes.
Women’s bodies have always been central in post-revolutionary political discourse. 
Considered sometimes as a flag and badge o f national pride, and other times as an 
emblem of shame and humiliation, a woman’s public appearance has had a strong 
impact on the individual and collective consciousness of Iranians. Attempts to restore 
as well as sweep aside old orders or to establish or annul new ones have often 
revolved around the female body. (Milani, 2001:9)
One of the ways in which gender is manifested in spatial planning in Tehran is
through the gendering of the streets. Public spaces and streets in Tehran make visible the
urban life through what Abu-Lughod terms the “mechanism of visual control” in Islamic
cities. In Islamic cities visual control emerges in different ways, including the assertion of
boundaries. Islamic architecture creates spaces that are highly articulated in terms of form
and function. In the religious architecture of the mosques, the concept of the "sacred"
18 By this I want to emphasize some internal factors which are not necessarily the result of “Western” 
external influences on Islamic cities that have been well formulated in Abu-Lughod’s conclusion in the 
above mentioned article.
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maps a large terrain bounded by the profane. Boundaries also define strongly opposed 
gendered spaces. According to Abu-Lughod, “What Islam required was some way of 
dividing functions and places on the basis of gender and then of creating a visual screen 
between them.” (Abu-Lughod, 1987:163)
In his investigation into the meaning of khattah (an Arabic/Persian term used for a 
place demarcated by a wall) and the territorial structure of early Muslim towns, Jamel 
Akbar brings in extensive ethnographic knowledge about the meaning of place and 
boundary from Islamic scholarly works dealing with various time periods. Relying on 
these erudite works, derived mostly from sources in philosophy, Arabic linguistics, and 
historical accounts of builders or building sponsors in Arab-Muslim Middle Eastern 
societies, Akbar discusses Khattah (verb) as “marking out a land that has not been settled 
before.” He further explains that in early Islamic times “this act almost always preceded 
the actual building” (Akbar, 1989: page 23-24). In an ethical context then, the boundary 
marks a strong sense of privacy and a delineation of property claim on the part of the 
Muslims. For example, the kitchen as women’s working place was not publicly 
accessible in traditional Iranian houses; thus a woman became a part of a man's private 
property and inaccessible to others. (Fig.28) Boundaries, in their various forms, from 
thick walls to colorful delicate glass shutters, created distinctly separate realms that often 
responded to gender differentiations.
The Prophet Mohammad said, “The house is a sacred area” (Campo, 1991:37). 
Boundaries emphasize the intermixing of the sexes and create particular patterns of 
“private,” “semi-private”and“public spaces” within the house. To define this 
schematically, in the traditional Islamic houses of Iran, there was a distinct and obvious
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border between spaces and rooms that belonged to men and those that belonged to 
women. The geographic and topographic conditions of most arid lands of Iran added 
another element to the houses: the courtyards. The general plan of the houses was an 
open rectangular courtyard, with rooms around two or four sides. (Fig. 32)
The tall surrounding walls of the courtyard usually provided privacy for the 
residents. Houses were closed off from the street and turned inward onto a courtyard. The 
concern for privacy dictated the street facades—all blank, all with the same color and 
height, and mostly without decoration. It created a sense of mystery and evoked curiosity 
in the passersby.. Once again, the “mechanism of visual control." comes into play to 
protect the house not only from the direct line of vision but even from the imagination of 
strangers.
Interior Courtyard-
A Fig. 32 A traditional Islamic house in Iran. Yazd. (Pimia. 1993:182)
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The exterior was blank—the absence of windows, openings, eye-catching code or 
visual cues discouraged the imagination from extending beyond the boundary or 
intruding into the interior.
Inside the traditional house, the exterior walls of the rooms reflected the semiotics 
of sexual segregation: glass shutters—aedarf and panjdari (Fig. 32)—whose densely 
colorful decorated screens functioned as the literal boundaries which protected the 
interior of the room from the gaze o f namahram (strange man). Sexual segregation 
sometimes came into play in a very obvious manner. The main door of the house, for 
example, had two different doorknobs—one for women and the other for men (each made 
a different noise)—so that the residents of the house could tell whether a woman or a man 
was entering the house.
Public spaces in traditional Iranian cities belonged to men. In the past, most 
women spent the majority of their lives within their homes and courtyards, and went out 
only for serious and approved reasons. Outside the home, social life generally was 
limited to the activities of men. Separate, gender-based turfs prevented physical contact 
between men and women, and enabled visual privacy. Women were only allowed limited 
access to public spaces. The mosque was mainly a male dominated space; however, 
women were permitted to attend the mosque and to say prayers in marginal spaces such 
as the narrow balconies of the upper floors, and other spaces that were kept apart from 
the main halls by curtains19 (Fig. 32). Male and female spheres were thus differentiated 
physically and visually.
19 In his book Deconstructing the American Mosque Akel Ismail Kahera argues that the division of space in 
Islamic mosques in Egypt has always been biased against women. He quotes from the jurist of al-Azhar, 
Mahmoud Shaltout, who comments on issues of gender in the mosques: “There is no special Jum’ah 
[Friday congregational worship] for Muslim women.... The consensus of opinion of all the Muslims past
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In contemporary Iranian spatial settings, the concept of gendered space still exists, 
although not in its traditional form. For example, the planning principles of contemporary 
Iranian houses reveal an order determined by Western architecture. This borrowed 
architectural order testifies to the struggle of the Iranian nation to define a contemporary 
model for their living spaces. The conception of gendered spatial differentiation that 
traditionally employed boundaries and walls has, in fact, turned into unidentified 
gendered spatial zones both in the residential space and various public places. Women 
usually reside at the margins of the overall space of the modem houses. For example, 
they rarely occupy the center of the living room when other men are in the house. 
Similarly, in public places women occupy the marginal zones. They choose the comer of 
the sidewalks or a blank spot in public parks, restaurants, and coffee shops. In mosques 
the women’s section typically occupies a comer; the space is unevenly divided (the larger 
section belongs to men regardless of the number of men and women who are present in 
the mosque), usually by a curtain (Fig.33). Women are not even allowed access to some 
public places such as sports stadiums. According to the ideologies of the Islamic 
government of Iran, mobility and activity are against women’s nature.
and present is that there should be no special prayer for women. But they can pray- if they wish to attend 
the Jum ’ah -  with men in one jamaat [congregation] behind the same imam with the same 
khutbah[sem\on]m the same place, but they should line up behind the men.” (Kahera, 2002: 120)
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▲ Fig 33 Traditional Mosque in Iran. Isfahan (Pimia. 1993 : 80). M en's space vs. W om en's Space in 
Contemporary Iranian Mosques. Shirin Neshat (Neshat. 2001: 38)
In contemporary Tehran, the sense of boundary is as strong as in its traditional 
settings. Yet we find a somewhat new mode: the "masculine"—the "sacred" him-self—is 
denoted by the presence of the boundary (that formerly only kept two contradictory 
spaces apart from one another) and also by the specific treatment of the boundary's 
surface as communicative medium. Therefore the masculine comes into play as a 
‘‘mediator element" that interrupts the merging of the public and the private space. The 
walls of Tehran are made over into the simulacrum of the "sacred” masculine bodies, 
while real bodies (especially female bodies) in their turn are transformed into something 
distinctively alien. (Fig.34)
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As commodities, women are thus two things at once: utilitarian objects and bearers o f value.
(Luce l rigor ay. 1985: 175)
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The Wrapped Body: An Intervening Image
The Image of Women and Urban Space in Tehran
In contemporary Iranian fine arts, cinema, and literature, women's wrapped 
bodies are symbolically used for the purpose of making a political statement about 
women's repression in all aspects of life. Shirin Neshat's conceptual artworks make a 
deliberate assertion about the control of female veiled bodies in Iranian cities. Shirin 
Neshat left Iran in 1974. When she returned in 1990, she was shocked by the frightening 
changes, by the enormous difference between what she remembered from Iran before the 
revolution and what she was witnessing sixteen years later. Later she recreated her 
understanding of women's bodies in post-revolutionary political discourse. Here is how 
she describes it: “As I became increasingly involved with Islamic topics, it seemed only 
appropriate to explore space and architecture from the ideological point of view. I came 
upon interesting parallels concerning the way in which the female body and space are 





In fact, the image of women’s bodies has always been central to the 
construction of public space in Iranian political discourse. Soon after Reza Shah came 
to power at the beginning of the twentieth century, he embarked on his quest to 
modernize Iranian cities, ordering that the streets be rid of the most conspicuous sign of 
backwardness—the veil. After five years of forced unveiling (1936-1941), Reza Shah 
of Iran was ousted by the Allied forces, and clerics cried for the return of the veil. 
(Shirazi, 2001:91)
The process of unveiling women, however, continued later during the reign of 
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. In 1963, strongly encouraged by his American 
advisors, the Shah agreed to reforms. These reforms, which took place under a 
movement called the “White Revolution,” included women’s enfranchisement. The 
modernization efforts of the Shah led to a visible schism among Iranian women: 
unveiled, educated women living in towns tended to belong to the “Westernized” upper 
and middle classes; veiled women living in towns were educated at home, often by 
tutors; and veiled women living in rural areas were mostly illiterate. It was the unveiled 
“Westernized” Iranian woman who became a scapegoat for the demagogues of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. (Shirazi, 2001:91)
In 1979, regardless of social class and family background, women were eager 
to be veiled, even if it meant supporting the clergy which historically 
opposedlegislation giving women more rights. The Islamic Republic of Iran quickly 
squashed women’s hopes and ambitions for improving their lives. It introduced many 
new rules and regulations concerning all aspects of women’s lives. Now there were 
rules about which kinds of jobs women could hold and which subjects they could study.
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Now a woman had to ask her husband’s permission if she wanted to work. Women
were aggressively encouraged to have large families; female sexual abstinence was
declared a sufficient reason for divorce. And women were now persuaded, often by
force, to veil. Women who appeared unveiled in public were assumed to be opposed to
the tenets of the Islamic revolution and thus were suspect not only religiously but also
politically (Shirazi, 2001: 92). Women were obligatorily re-veiled in 1983:
In 1983, an announcement was added to the [new Iranian] constitution stating that 
women who harm public chastity by appearing in public without the religiously 
sanctioned veil are subject to receiving up to 74 lashes. In 1986, another amendment 
was added stating that those in public view whose dress and makeup are in violation 
of religious law and those who cause the spread of corruption or violate public 
chastity will be arrested, given priority when tried in the proper court, and 
accordingly sentenced to one of the punishments listed in the addendum. (Shirazi,
2001:93)
Outside of Iran, images of the veiled woman have been used in Middle 
Eastem/Islamic countries and Western societies alike in order to hawk commercial 
products. These images are credited with a kind of oriental eroticism, which has become 
iconic in the eyes of Westerners. In Iran, however, the imposition of the veil since the 
Islamic Revolution has not entailed erotic meanings, nor was the veil intended to capture 
the male gaze, as some stereotypical interpretations would have us believe. As Milani puts 
it, the soc/o-cultural implications of the veil in post-revolutionary Iran went beyond its 
traditional significance (Milani, 1992:38). With its strong symbolic connotations, the veil 
became, among other things, a revolutionary emblem. It attained a level of political and 
nationalistic expression not previously achieved or even envisioned in Iran. (Milani, 1992: 
154)
Wrapped in the veil, Iranian women simultaneously reside in both public and 
private spaces. In fact, women’s wrapped bodies have been abused in order to create a new
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image for the public environments of the city. These wrapped bodies Islamicize the city 
along with the walls that are wrapped in and bounded by the body images of the 
Ayatollahs.
The conventional equation: veiled/silent/absent proved to be no longer operative.
Some veiled women are both publicly articulate and visible. In this shifting meaning 
of the veil, women are neither eliminated from communal life nor relegated to the 
domain of the private. They are voiced and ever so present in the public scene. The 
veil has thus developed new connotations quite different from the traditional notions.
It is argued, for instance, that the veil frees the country of alien ideologies and 
establishes women’s independence from western domination or styles. Moreover, 
those who support the veil use every occasion to justify and glorify its use not only in 
religious or nationalistic terms but also in terms of interests serving women’s own 
welfare. (Milani, 1992:38)
The concept of the veil in Iran thus departs from that in other Islamic countries. In 
other Islamic countries, women are mostly separated from the public space, and the veil 
signifies women’s responsibility for maintaining family honor and ensures that they do not 
dishonor their families. The veil limits women’s mobility, places restrictions on behavior 
and activities, and permits women only limited contact with the opposite sex.
According to Ayatollah Ali Shariati “[By means of Hijab], Iranian woman 
‘actualizes’ herself as a believer who negates Western Values” (Shirazi, 2001:93). In her 
book. The Veil Unveiled, Faeghe Shirazi provides extensive information about the impact 
of the veil on East-West material cultural products. She devotes a chapter to cultural 
products such as postage stamps, posters, and films in post-revolutionary Iran which depict 
veiled women as strong support for the basis of the revolution. Shirazi argues that “the 
moral defense of the Islamic republic seems to rest painfully on the shoulders of the 
properly veiled woman. She has become Iran’s cultural bulwark against the cultural assault 
of Western nations” (Shirazi, 2001: 108). In other words, covered bodies of women came 
into play as ideological symbols to support the goals of the revolution. These images in 
public spaces have been a strong tool for preserving the Islamic regime’s power since the
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early years of the revolution. The image of veiled women protesting in mass 
demonstrations is one example among many that reinforces how images of the wrapped 
bodies of women are mobilized in order to create a new identity for the city (Fig.36 & 37 & 
38). Irigaray best explains that “as commodities, women are thus two things at once: 
utilitarian objects and bearers of value.” (Luce Irigaray, 1998)
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▲ Fig 37 from top to bottom: Creating a new image for Tehran, photom ontage by the author; W omen's body: a socio­
political artifact in creating a new identity for the city, w ww.BBC.com.
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A Fig. 38 W om en's body: a socio-political artifact in creating a new identity for the city (ww w.Tehran24.com)
The veil was not limited to the actual wrapped bodies of women. Images of a
faceless veiled body of a woman are often used in the slogans plastered all over the 
white-washed walls of the houses, office buildings, institutional centers, and factories in 
Iran. (Fig. 39)
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Recently, even a few illustrated veiled portraits of female actresses on the billboards 
are most often covered by the government (Fig. 40). Badjens.com. the Iranian feminist 
newsletter, asserts:
In commemoration o f  Imam All's martyrdom, the nineteenth day o f  the month o f  
Ramadan began five days o f  mourning for Shi'a Muslims. On the first day o f  
mourning, Tehran residents woke up to black cloths hanging over several movie 
billboards. This year was different in that only the women’s faces were concealed. In 
past years, the entire billboards were covered. For a naked glimpse, see The 
Towering Wall behind Youth in this edition. (www.Badjens.com, 2003)
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A Fig 40 from top to bottom: In commemoration o f Imam All's martyrdom, on the first day o f  mourning. Tehran residents 
woke up to black cloths hanging over women's faces (ww w.Badiens.com. 2003)
Women who do not appreciate the veil are subject to ideological criticism. Val 
Moghadam writes that “On the walls of Tehran and other major cities, always covered
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with inscriptions of one type or another, the following admonition can be seen: ‘Do the 
women who oppose hijab  not feel ashamed before the corpses of the martyrs of 
Karbala’?” (Moghadam, 1988:225)
▲ Fig. 41 “The Wrapped Bodies,” Photo by the author & M. Gonzales
C h ador, The Portable Habitat:
Women's Veiled Body and Public Space in Tehran
It is interesting that the term ethics is derived from the Greek word ethos, meaning 
dwelling, or habitat. Dwelling is both a noun (a place to which one returns) and a verb (the 
practice o f  dwelling); my dwelling is both my habitat and my habitual way o f  life. My habitual 
way o f life, ethos or set o f  habits determines my character (my specificity or what is probably my 
own). These habits are not given: they are constituted through the repetition o f  bodily acts the 
character o f which is governed by the habit I occupy. From this understanding o f  ethos, ethics can 
be defined as the study and practice o f  that which constitutes one’s habitat, or as the problematic 
o f  the constitution o f  one's embodied place in the world. (Diprose. 1994:19)
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The above quotation suggests that an understanding of ethics centers on a constitutive 
relation between one’s habitat and one’s embodied nature. This notion identifies the 
body as the locus of one’s ethos—where the body is constituted by a relation to its 
habitat.
The challenging task of defining the meaning of the “veil” in its historical, 
religious, and traditional context requires something more than seeing the veil as an entity 
that can straightforwardly be understood as a secondary space for women’s bodies in 
public. This way of understanding the bodies of women in relation to their habitat is 
based on how women remain in the private space where they are meant to dwell—-the 
veil—but it ignores how women’s wrapped bodies can be seen from the outside within 
the context of the city. We can find specific evidence of the interrelations of women’s 
bodies and space in post-revolutionary Tehran by looking at the first feminist-conscious 
enunciations that carefully and cautiously appeared in media—literature, cinema and 
conceptual art in the post-revolutionary period.
Only a few examples speak to the interrelations of women’s body and space. As 
Farzaneh Milani puts it,“veiling not only curtailed women’s bodily expression but also 
inhibited their verbal self expression” (Milani, 1992: 6). There can be a lot of pressure on 
women to omit details in order to disguise truths about themselves they do not want to 
face up to or speak out loud. Women have been drilled in the rules of moral/ Islamic 
discourse, thus internalizing censorship from the outside into a kind of self-censorship 
from within. Talking openly about certain matters~“telling the truth about their own 
experience as a body,” as Virginia Woolf put it—“is not nice” (Maris, 1989: xi). The
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proscriptions placed on Iranian women’s speech foster feelings of shame that lead women
to trivialize their own experiences and prevent them from discovering the depth of their
lives. Given the religious and social constraints on women’s self-expression in public,
exceptionally few women have been able to break the silence.
Writing with its potential for public communication, for entering into the world of 
others, could be considered no less a transgression than unveiling. In both, a woman 
expresses/ exposes herself publicly. Through both, an absence becomes a presence.
Both are means of expression and communication: one gives her voice a body; the 
other gives her body a voice. (Milani, 1992: 6)
Shahmoush Parsipour’s20 literary works are among the few feminist-conscious 
writings that appeared inside Iran in response to limitations imposed on women by the 
state ideology (Talattof, 1998: XV). Parsipour looks at the interrelation of body and space 
from the inside. Perhaps she attempts to follow her own feelings to express a 
psychological condition that can be applied to most Iranian women. In fact Parsipour 
searches for a better correlation between space and women’s corporeal existence. In her 
stories she describes in detail the physical aspects of women’s bodies, such as their 
virginity, their hair, their hands, and head. More importantly, she relates these physical 
aspects of the body to conceptions of spatiality. A garden serves as the formal space of 
departure for almost all of her characters in the narrative of Women Without Men', it's a 
place where women acquire their destiny and it also represents the sexuality of their 
bodies.
The garden becomes the ultimate destination, a sort of utopia and a place of 
congregation for these women, who are disenfranchised from society. In the garden, 
the presence o f a man is minimal, and a woman may live independently or choose to 
become whatever she wants—even a tree. She may turn into smoke to ascend into the 
skies. She may decide to remain on earth to pursue a “normal” life. The garden 
promises hope, freedom, and mobility. (Talattof, 1998: XIV)
20 The prominent novelist Parsipour was imprisoned in Iran because of her novel Women without Men, in 
which she refers to menstruation and virginity. She now lives in exile.
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In post-revolutionary prose by Iranian women, we also find a desire to eliminate 
masculine corporeal being on behalf of the female characters. In the garden of Women 
Without Men, men have a minimal presence. On one occasion the male body gets 
fragmented in the thought of a female character known as Zarrincolah, a vivacious young 
prostitute who has worked in a brothel since childhood. One Sunday morning when the 
women are obliged to serve customers who have an early morning urge, she sees a man 
enter as usual, but he is without a head. The headless customer does his business and 
leaves. From that day on she finds all the customers headless. She vainly tries to 
overcome the resulting fear by singing at night, and eventually comes to the conclusion 
that she has to leave the house. Zarrincolah ends up in a garden (Talattof, 1998: XIV). 
The decapitated male body gives birth to the refuge of the garden, in which the presence 
of a man is supposedly minimal. The absence of one results in the presence of another, or 
in Henri Bergson’s words: “The presence of the one may be said to consist in the 
absence of the other.” (Henri Bergson, 1911:298)
The absence of the head suggests more gradually the absence of outside 
authorities. Going back to the dominant image in the propagandist murals, one can draw a 
link between the dominant image of the head and government regulations. Most of 
figures depicted in the political propaganda are portrayed from neck up. The head 
demands and constitutes certain laws; the head becomes an icon for transferring a 
preaching language to people. Furthermore, the masculinity of the head mostly represses 
women’s power as well as women’s sexuality.
In Tuba and the Meaning o f the Night, Parsipour tells us the story of a woman 
who comes to the conclusion that “women have suffered throughout history mainly
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because they live in a world that does not belong to them, a world where they do not even 
have a chance to enjoy nature” (Talattof, 1998, IX). What is regarded as nature can also 
be considered “the outside”—somewhere far away from home and the restrictions of the 
interior with its boundaries, and even far from the city (which is a sphere of male 
dominance). The outside, however, always remains a desire in the minds of the 
characters. Female characters in Parsipour's stories almost always search for a “garden”; 
however, when they reach the “garden,”21 their lives seem no longer a reality. “The 
realities of male-dominated society still disturb the garden experience as the women 
travel to it.” (Talattof, 1998: XV)
The gardens that Parsipour describes are all located in Karaj, a small town near 
Tehran, which is well-known for its pre-revolutionary brothels and therefore symbolizes 
a place of freedom from sexual bounds and social restrictions. The garden is a place far 
from town “where women would not have any freedom of movement.” (Friedl, 2001: 
116)
Wrapped by an artificial skin (veil), the women of Tehran literally do not relate to 
the outside, because, as Beatriz Colomina states, “To be outside is to be in the image, to 
be seen, whether in the press photograph, a magazine, a movie, on television, or at your 
window” (Colomina, 1994:7).
Sex-segregation has influenced the public lives of Iranian women for several 
centuries, but it was only in the mid-nineteenth century that women began to appear more 
and more in public places. Slow at first, and prompted by forces of modernity, 
desegregation gained momentum in the 1940s and 50s. However, as women began to
21 The gardens, Pardis, built by emperors in Achaemenian Iran gave rise to the modem English word 
“paradise”. Iranian architecture strongly emphasizes a deep passion for gardens and fountains.
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leave the cloisters of their homes and reshape those territories previously dominated by 
men, anxiety over the breakdown of the moral fabric of society increased. The anxiety 
reached its apogee after the Islamic revolution of 1979, which reasserted male control 
over public space (Milani, 2001:8). Since then, “Sex-segregation does not only veil a 
women’s voice, it also marks off the public arena as a masculine territory.” (Milani, 
2001:9)
In the summer of 2001, forty-seven Iranian women registered themselves as 
candidates for the presidential elections; none of them were allowed to run. Mrs. 
President & documentary by Shahla Haeri, presents the thoughts and views of some of 
these women, who discuss their efforts to change both governmental and popular opinion 
regarding the role of women in Iranian politics and society.
One of the candidates—a strict Muslim high school principal—expresses her 
feelings toward the veil or what she calls “the black Chador"'. “I disagree with the idea 
that women should only wear black chador and remain a housewife for their entire life. I 
am opposed to my own black chador too. I’ve been forced to wear this since the age of 
three and I am used to it ....But black veil was truly the invention of the Safavid Shiite in 
Iran.” (Shahla Haeri, 2001)
In the end the principal concludes that women can be both veiled and active 
politically. However, she expressly states the negative feelings she has toward her “black 
chador.” Instead of coming up with a convincing solution, she simply changes the theme 
of her argument by bringing in historical surveys about faults of the Safavids in the 
creation of the black chador for women. In effect, the principal tries to rescue herself 
from any critical debates over her opinions. All the other presidential candidates, mostly
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from the strict Muslim population of Iran, also raise issues related to the veil. Yet they are 
not capable of clarifying the problem. They simply change the theme of their argument 
when they find themselves unable to elaborate on their feelings about Iranian women's 
veils. In the process, they may suppress the psychological suffering of many years. Here 
most poignantly we see the internalizing apparatus of self-censorship that has for so long 
impacted Iranian society.
Urban Space and Phobia
The soul has moments o f  escape, 
when bursting all the dors.
She dances like a bomb, 
aboard,
and swings upon the hours 
Doom is the house without a door,
‘Tis entered from the sun, and then the ladder's thrown away,
because escape is done. (Dickinson, in The House without a Door. 1989:114)
◄ Fig. 42 "The O utside-Phobia.” Photo by the author & 
M. Gonzales
As Farzaneh Milani subtly describes, a 
survey of the history of urban design in 
twentieth century Iran reveals that 
women's bodies have always been central 
to Iranian political discourse on the 
reconstruction of public space. Soon after 
Reza Shah ousted the Qajar dynasty in the beginning of the twentieth century, he 
embarked on his quest to modernize Iran by adapting western styles in various cultural
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domains such as architecture, urbanism and men’s and women’s clothing. His reign 
marked the beginning of a period of socioeconomic reform and the secularization of 
Muslim culture. When Reza Shah returned from a visit to Turkey, where Kemal 
Ataturk had started to implement secular reforms, including unveiling, he called his 
cabinet members and told them: “We must change our image and tradition to that of the 
West. The first step is to change men’s traditional hats to chapeaux. Then the unveiling 
process must take place...” (Shirazi, 2001: 89). When the anti-veil offensive was 
finally launched, police were instructed to forcibly remove women’s veils in the streets. 
They were ordered to rid the streets of this most conspicuous sign of backwardness 
(Shirazi, 2001:90). Many women from traditional families, afraid of being attacked by 
Reza Shah’s police, refused to appear in the streets and other public places. “Women 
wearing the chador were not allowed in theatres or public baths, mid taxi and bus 
drivers were liable to fines if they accepted veiled women” (Milani, 1992: 34). “This 
forced unveiling inflicted pain and terror upon those women who were not willing or 
ready to unveil. Incapable of leaving home unveiled, in cases of emergency...they 
made their sons, husbands, or brothers carry them on their shoulders hidden in sacks” 
(Milani, 1992: 35).
Women’s desperate desire to cover every part of their bodies in public is 
something that might be taken into consideration within the framework of gendered 
space. Why was it so important for them to wrap their entire bodies in public? What 
psychological, social, and cultural forces provoked those women to resist the anti­
veiling process? Stories of women who remained in their houses for several years are 
passed down to succeeding generations by mothers and grandmothers who either
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experienced the phenomenon themselves or knew others who had. These stories have 
even become part of Iranian women’s collective memory. Apparently, resistance to the 
unveiling process has always simply been attributed to faithfulness to Islam on the part 
of “good Iranian Muslim women” and faithfulness to their moral responsibility. The 
veil was a source of respect, virtue, protection and pride.
However, a deeper analysis of the issue reveals that the desire to remain veiled 
could be related to fear of open space or agoraphobia. The appearance of this phobia on 
the part of women during this period has not been given the scholarly attention it 
deserves in work on Iranian society. As established by Esther Da Costa Meyer’s 
studies on the appearance of agoraphobia among nineteenth century bourgeois 
European women, the transition from a state of total dependence on men—domestic 
life—to one of expected independence—public life—precipitates a crisis, which may 
result in agoraphobia. However, such a transition is only one factor in the possible 
emergence of agoraphobia (or what I call outside phobia) among Iranian women. There 
are several other factors that may also have contributed to the phobia.
In her article on agoraphobia, women, and public space, Esther Da Costa Meyer 
provides extensive information about major studies in the field, underscoring the 
interrelations between agoraphobia, sexuality and architecture in nineteenth century 
Europe (Da Costa Meyer, 1996: 147). She argues that Freud successfully isolated the 
main components of the symptomatology of agoraphobia, which is mainly the 
underlying sexual symbolism” (Da Costa Meyer, 1996: 147). Freud maintains that 
agoraphobia threatens mostly women. However, true to form, Freud was only 
successful in defining agoraphobia and its sexual connotations within the framework of
79
the oedipal triangle based on the case study of a young boy. Furthermore, conceptions 
o f agoraphobia for both Freud and Da Costa Meyer are derived from the nineteenth 
century bourgeois experience, removed from the realities of Islamic society. 
Nevertheless, European and Islamic societies share some conceptions in regard to 
issues o f spatiality and the dichotomy of inside and outside. From a psychological point 
of view, agoraphobia is marked by a fear of being alone, or of being in public places 
from which escape might be difficult or help not available in case of sudden 
incapacitation. Issues of embodiment in space are thus other factors that should be 
taken into consideration, for they transcend social context. Normal activities are 
increasingly restricted, as fears or avoidance behavior dominate an individual’s life 
(Mairs, 1989, 30). Agoraphobes most commonly avoid crowds, such as busy streets or 
crowded stores, tunnels, bridges, elevators, and public transportation. “Often 
agoraphobes insist that family members or friends accompany them whenever they 
leave home.” (Mairs, 1989,32)
In contemporary Tehran, agoraphobia must, I think, be related to power. The 
translocation of boundary from an architectural object to the image of a masculine 
political figure has had great impact on the ways in which women relate to public space 
and has led to a drastic change from home to the outside. In Islamic public spaces, the 
veil can, in fact, protect women’s bodies from the outside. Physically it is the site of 
others; psychologically it is the site of fears.
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Interestingly, there are some connections between conceptions of spatiality and the veil in 
Iranian cultural contexts. The term chador in Persian means tent and indeed the veil 
functions as a portable habitat, reduced in size to the bulk of a woman’s body.
Chador [veil] is perhaps one of the most symbolically significant structures o f a 
complex cultural heritage that expresses, among other things, Iran’s prevailing 
attitude toward the self and the other. It indicates ways in which people relate to or 
interact with each other and, ultimately, with themselves. It is a ritualistic expression 
o f  culturally defined boundaries. Like walls that enclose houses and separate inner 
and outer space, the veil makes a clear statement about the disjunction between the 
private and the public. (Milan!, 1992: 23)
Agoraphobia in the Islamic city of Tehran is a result of the Islamic republic’s 
identification of femininity with immobility—the main element in the fabricated ideal of 
the “perfect woman.” 22 Here a young female university student in Tehran expresses her 
feelings about the city: “At high school my movements were very limited and I didn’t 
know much of the city. Now I have to move around on my own and it is both exciting 
and a bit scary” (Madanipour, 1998: 155).
The fear of the outside might also be related to society’s tendency to keep 
women in the house. A young girl in Tehran said, “I have not seen my married sister in 
ten months because her in-laws won’t let her out of the house” (Friedl, 2001: 119). In her 
article The Thorny Side o f Marriage in Iran, Erika Friedl argues that women who are out 
alone are routinely harassed: “A thirty-year-old single woman in Tehran said, ‘I leave for 
work in the morning only after my downstairs neighbor has left because if  he hears me on 
the stairs he opens his door and make advances at me’” (Friedl, 2001: 118). Another 
young lady who lives in a small town says “I don’t go out at all anymore, only to school,
22 For example according to Ayatollah Mahdi Hadavi Tehran!: “Women’s primary duties are in the private 
sphere of the family and that modesty demands that they be covered while in public.” ( “A profile o f a 
Modem Ayatollah,” www.pbs.org)
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for fear that a dirty-minded guy will tell his mother about me and she will come here as a 
matchmaker” (Friedl, 2001: 114). The outside is therefore associated with male 
supremacy, sexual harassment, and social control. In her movie, The Apple, Samira 
Makhmalbaf illustrates the devastating fear of the outside on the part of two young girls. 
In one scene a social worker says “The problem is that they are girls. If they were boys 
they could have played outside. They could even climb people’s walls...” (Dabashi, 
2001: 271). The Apple turns the real-life story of the protective incarceration of two 
young sisters by their father into an allegory of deliverance and redemption. It can, 
however, be understood as a story of the repression of women’s desire to be on the 
outside in Iran or elsewhere in Islamic societies. The most perplexing characteristic of 
this phobia in Tehran, I think, lies in women who want to be in power. They cannot 
stand the masculine architectural imagery. They have a phobia toward being on the 
outside because the “outside” reinforces the repressed desire of “being in power,” 
literally, of being a man! 23
Many women in Iran, in fact, prefer to be wrapped by the veil in public spaces. In 
her book Women o f Iran: the conflict with fundamentalist Islam, Farah Azari calls this the 
justification of self-repression (Azari, 1983:57). Azari is interested in revealing the 
reasons behind the lack of feminist consciousness among women in Iran (especially in
23 The entire discussion of the outside phobia can also be read within the discourse of shame. Like space, 
the body is territorialized-by modalities of definition and classification and by flows of power. According 
to Islamic fikh (law), women’s bodies without the veil are not passive. They influence their surrounding 
space. According to this view, if not covered by the veil, women find their desires, pleasures and feelings 
naked and vulnerable in face of others. Shame as a form o f repression comes into play to prevent women 
from being unveiled in public.
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the 1980s). She argues that women who support the idea of being veiled in public harbor 
the mistaken idea that non-veiled Western women are constantly harassed in public. This 
image, she argues, was popularized in the media by religious leaders (Azari. 1983:59). 
Set in this context, one can see that whether in agreement or not with the ideology of 
being covered in public, Iranian women are by and large threatened by the fear of public 
space.
Corporeality, Being and Movement
“One cannot grasp the unity o f  the object without the mediation o f  bodily 
experience.” (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1962:279)
I have a body because I have a clear and distinguished zone o f  expression. (Deleuze.
1993: 85)
Women in Iran are isolated from the public space of the city. Many walls 
surround them: the walls of their homes, the walls of masculine political propaganda, 
and the walls of their veil. Even in traditional Shiite stories and myths the image of 
women is obscured by virtue of her unseen body. In contemporary Tehran, walls 
mediate male desires. The built environment operates with walls and through the 
walls while reinforcing patriarchal and bodily fears. These walls are the defining 
moment between the female populace and male individuals. Women's bodies, in turn, 
come into existence by being washed up in a “liminaT space, metaphorically similar 
to the space between the conscious and the unconscious, between knowledge of their 
physical presence and the unknown of the masculine other. Social structures have
83
long had a tendency to dismiss the reality of women’s sexuality within the universal 
gender-free frameworks.
Women’s existence is classified by liminality.24 As Barbara Babcock writes in 
“Women/women in ‘the discourse of man’: Edie Turner and Victor Turner’s 
Language of the Feminine,” liminality is feminine:
Liminality can perhaps be described as a fractal chaos, a fertile nothingness, a 
storehouse o f possibilities, not by any means a random assemblage but a striving 
after new forms and structure, a gestation process, ....It is what goes on in nature in 
the fertilized egg, in the chrysalis, and even more richly and complexly in their 
cultural homologues. (Victor Turner in Babcock, 2001: 116)
Liminality is always associated with transitional passage between alternative 
states, a concept reinforced by Luce Irigaray in her book The Forgetting o f Air in 
Martin Heidegger (Irigaray, 1999). Irigaray provides a subaltern, “liminal” view of 
architectural dwelling and the ideology of “being” as it was described in the 1950s by 
Heidegger. In “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Heidegger supplanted material 
conceptions of architecture with a concern for the relationship between space and 
“being” (Heidegger, in Hofstadter, 2001). Irigaray criticizes Heidegger for connecting 
all aspects of life into a unitary notion of “being” rather than differentiating between 
female beings and male beings: “one always issues from two that are irreducibly 
different.” (Irigary 1999:129)
24 Victor Turner defines liminal in these words: “As members of society most of us only see what we 
expect to see and what we expect to see is what we are conditioned to see when we have learned the 
definitions and classifications of our culture. A society’s secular definitions do not allow for the existence 
of a not-boy-not-man, which is what a novice in a male puberty rite is (if he can be said to be anything).
But a set of essentially religious definitions co-exist with these, which do set out to define the structurally 
indefinable ‘transitional being.’ The transitional being or ‘liminal person’ is defined by a name, and by a set 
o f symbols. The same name is very frequently employed to designate those who are being initiated into 
very different states of life. For example, among the Ndemdu ofNorthem Rhodesia the name mwadyi may 
mean various things: it may stand for ‘a boy novice in circumcision rites,’ or, yet again, ‘the first or ritual 
wife’ ....’’ (Turner, 1964:6)
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Iranian social structure has long had a tendency to dismiss the reality of 
women’s repression, which is due to their sex, within the liturgical gender-free 
frameworks. By dismantling this situated method of looking at female bodies, one can 
see the body as a site for a play of forces, as women are understood simultaneously to 
be sexual objects, socio-political artifacts, and mothers. According to Rosi Braidotti, 
this body can be also seen as a theoretical topos in an attempt to overcome the 
classical mind-body dualism of Cartesian origins, in order to reconceive the structure 
of the thinking subject. The body is then an interface, a threshold, a field of 
interesting material and symbolic forces (Braidotti, 1994: 169). Typically, however, 
woman’s corporeality in Iran is reduced to the singular meaning of a dominant 
ideological discourse: that is, the body as emblem of Islam. In Islamic philosophy, 
bodies and spaces are linked together in a slightly different way from that suggested 
by the radical Islamic government of Iran.
In his book Deconstructing the American Mosque, Akel Ismail Kahera devotes 
a section to the notion o f ‘being’ and its relationship to Islamic architecture. Kahera 
compares and contrasts the notion of ‘being’ found in western ideology to that of 
Islam.
...Muslim architecture represents a nexus of temporality; hence, knowledge o f being 
shares a meaningful relationship with idioms of architectural expression. Perhaps the 
statement that is farthest from this concept is Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum''25 (1 think 
therefore 1 am). Cogito ergo sum suggests that thinking and awareness o f thought are 
the real substance of being, but it also celebrates the separation o f the mind from the 
body and other activities of being. This Cartesian maxim, which has been adopted in 
the West to describe reality, is related to the crisis o f architecture, which is o f course
25 Kahera’s examination of body and space is ahistorical. He tends to compare and contrast the 
contemporary existing notions of body and space in Islamic thought with those found in seventeenth 
century Europe.
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also a human crisis. In Islam man is not the center of the universe {homo miversale);
neither is he the measure o f all things .... (Kahera, 2002:116)
Kahera connects the relationship of bodies and spaces in some contemporary 
mosques to issues of spirituality which originated in medieval Islamic architecture: A 
mosque is both contained and a container. The container does not really exist 
independently as a tangible form, but rather it exists in the consciousness of the beholder, 
who visually perceives physical boundaries of space while the intellect perceives the 
spirits of those elements that are contained. (Kahera, 2002: 117)
Medieval Islamic philosophy considers spaces as the objects that are always 
filled, even when they seem empty to the senses. The Ikhwan al Safa26 believed that 
space is filled not only by materials or physical beings but also by spirits (Bowering, 
1992:78). On the contrary, they believed that spirits dealt in spaces. To show further the 
interrelatedness of things, the Ikhwan also classified the motions of the spirit in a manner 
similar to those of bodies and related the two to each other.
The key term in the Ikhwan theory about space is soul/spirit. According to 
Western philosophy, such as that of Hegel, spirit can be associated with thought, mind, 
and thinking subjects. To become aware of spirit is to understand human consciousness. 
According to Hegel, spirit in general is mobile, timeless, and placeless. As the Ikhwan 
states: “We call souls certain real substances, living and moving by their essences, and
26 Secret Arab brotherhood founded in Basra, Iraq, in the 10th century. The beliefs of the group diverged
sharply from orthodox Islam, incorporating elements of Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, astrology, and the 
occult sciences. The brotherhood is best known for having produced a philosophical and religious 
encyclopedia. Epistles o f the Brethren o f Purity and Loyal Friends, whose purpose was to provide 
enlightenment that would purify the soul and provide happiness in the next life, (www.britannica.com)
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we designate under the name movement the actions of a soul on a body” (Ikhwan, in 
Denys Johnson-Davies and Sabiha Khemir, 1994:82). Again in the Ikhwan’s words, 
“Movement is a form imposed on a body by the universal soul after it has been shaped, 
and rest is the absence of this form.” Spirit, therefore, involves a dynamic relation 
between the subject (being) and something other than it (space). Through opposing or 
negating the other, the subject (spirit) attains consciousness. In this sense, spirit can be 
considered as self-consciousness. The more closely an individual can identify with her 
space and world, and the more lucidly this relation is understood by her, the higher such a 
person’s consciousness becomes. In this case, spirit is self-conscious and is progressively 
unified by concrete interaction with whatever is ostensibly other than it, such as space. 
The Ikhwan’s theology therefore indicates a way of looking at body, space, and the 
world; it differs from the theology of Iran’s revolutionary clerics because it rejects the 
canonical representation of a sacred body in the space. This system of thought suggests a 
model of bodies that are not monolithic, total, and distinct entities, but an assemblage or 
collection of parts, capable of crossing the space as a whole.
Although Kahera doesn’t say so, Kahera’s thought is rooted in Ikhwan’s theories 
about being and space. However, for both the Ikhwan and Kahera the body as a material 
being is not of significance; the materiality o f the body and its sexuality are absent from 
their analyses.
By considering the body in movement, we can see better how the body inhabits 
space. Instead of submitting passively to space and time, the body in movement is 
activated. People walking by the murals in Tehran find themselves in communication
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with the fixed images of the bodies. These murals present a series of bodies in spaces, 
not moving—not active. In the street people sometimes don't know anything about 
these huge bodies, although the latter enliven the space.
The examples of images in Tehran, as well as in Baghdad. New York, and Los 
Angeles, show that as we walk in the street, we engage the material and the metaphorical; 
space and knowledge, and the cultural practices implicit in the images. Clearly, the 
spatiality of our body is brought into being through action.
he Absent Authenticity
◄ Fig.43 A giant mural o f  Marilyn Monroe. Hollywood. 
Photo by the author
Traditional Islamic visual culture initially 
prohibited any correspondence between real 
and represented objects. For this reason, 
contemporary ideological iconography in 
Tehran is for the most part a Western construct. In other words, the Western 
conception of media has been widely adopted in Tehran, but it has been covered by the 
gloss of religion.
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◄ Fig. 44 A giant mural. Los Angeles. Sunset. Photo by the author
The covering and wrapping of city walls by
body images is not particular to dictatorial states,
nor is it limited to political propaganda in the
contemporary Middle East or elsewhere. Today, the
artful representations of Disney and Hollywood
characters are everywhere (Fig. 43, 44). People of
the world do not need to visit these hyperrealist
phenomena, rather, “hyperreality” envelops them
everywhere—it overrides people's lives regardless of location. In this sense, as Elizabeth
Grosz points out, “architecture inhabits us as much we see ourselves inhabiting it...”
(Grosz, 1994: 135). In his paper "The Overexposed City” (1986), Paul Virilio gives us a
clear definition of the interconnections between contemporary cities and “hyperreality.”
“Due to the cathode-ray tube’s imperceptible substance, the dimensions of space become
inseparable from their speed of transmission. Unity of place without the unity of time
makes the city disappear into the heterogeneity of advanced technology's temporal regime”
(Virilio, 1986:19). As Elizabeth Grosz argues, Virilio opens up a new argument towards
“new replacement of geographical space with the screen interface, the transformation of
distance and depth into pure surface, the reduction of space... the face-to-face encounter to
the terminal screen.” (Grosz, 1994: 135)
89
Similarly, the painted billboards in Tehran are daring forms that change social relations, 
because they allow people no response-people are simply passive spectators. The present 
system discourages the use of traditional Islamic sites as places of congregation, which could 
potentially undermine the government. Tehran is no longer a functional spatial entity that 
motivates social interaction but has become a “virtual” Tehran, wrapped in and bounded by 
political conservatism.
Urban objects in Tehran have become less important in the experience of the built 
environment than certain forms of representation such as the murals. Murals in Tehran, as 
well as elsewhere, make us wonder what might happen if the facades of all buildings were to 
be used as surfaces for transmitting ideological information. If all cities were to replicate the 
digital and non-digital murals of Times Square, would architecture then cease to be seen as a 
complex unified structure, and always be conceived as an assemblage?
These questions call attention to the importance of non-architectural means of creating 
spaces, methods that are not synonymous with fixed traditional building techniques. As 
suggested by Jonathan Hill, this creation involves more than the direct, metaphoric 
translation of physical openness and flexible structure (Hill, 1998:145-147). Other media, 
such as text and art, can enrich the kinds of person-environment relations particular to 
architecture. Times Square is a good example in this regard; it seems to break every rule of 
urban readability and regularity, challenging all traditional models of what a public space 
should be.
Like Times Square, Tehran’s public spaces break away from traditional attitudes 
toward building structures and urban objects. At the same time, its imagery is quite different
in content. The themes of these images are important to the way the image of the city as a
1
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whole is created in its citizens’ minds. In Tehran, the iconography o f power comes into 
existence as a double-sided phenomenon. While urban public spaces are now characterized 
by the transcendent capability of media, they remain static because of the resistance of the 
power of the clergy and the images that have been brought forth by them. Like religion, 
contemporary media today also transcend local cultures and places; but unlike religion, 
which demarcates limits by virtue of its practices, media neither find nor create boundaries 
and are thus not limited. In this sense, one might argue that the ideological wrappings of 
post-revolutionary Tehran are as uprooted, weightless, and inauthentic as the hype in some 
American cities, such as Los Angeles and Las Vegas. If Walter Benjamin found dialectical 
images in the Parisian glass arcades, we might look for them on the painted walls o f Tehran. 
These walls have become more permeable and less fixed and rigid than those found in 
Parisian arcades, for one side of the border already infects the “other media.”
Jean Baudrillard, the French cultural critic, regards Los Angeles as the world center of 
the inauthentic and weightless. He also maintains that, “the whole world is implicated in this 
uprootedness; however, there is only one exception: Islam...and perhaps that is why the West 
is so weak and vulnerable in the face of the certitudes of radical Islam” (Baudrillard, 
1989:53). In contrast to Baudrillard’s argument, and based on the ideological wrapping of 
Tehran, one might argue that the contemporary Islamic city of Tehran has been modernized 
through the same Western techniques that have shaped the inauthentic nature of some 
American cities (Fig.43-44). Los Angeles, with its mix of Hollywood and Disney, counts as 
a site of "anywhere.” Considering this, one might argue that there is not much difference in 
the inauthentic wrapping of the radical Islamic city of Tehran and the forged Hollywood 
media hype on the facades of buildings in Los Angeles.
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Unlike American patterns, words and symbols in Tehran are not used in space for 
commercial persuasion; however, they are used for political influence. The revolutionary 
leaders of Iran speak of the return of religion and the awakening of Islam. The struggle of 
authenticity contrasts with Western materialism and positivism, and the development of pure 
Islamic patterns is absent within the urban design under their control. The state is 
commissioned to revitalize, restore and preserve Islamic urban objects and architectural 
patterns. The Islamic city promised by the Muslim leaders of Iran has been transformed into 
an anti-Islamic city of weightlessness and inauthenticity, suggesting a lack of historical 
understanding of the content of Islamic popular culture and the concept of the sacred.
In this context, power comes into play not so much within the framework of those few 
accepted modes of citizens’ interaction, such as voting and protesting, but in symbolic 
political associations. Iranian politicians have succeeded in establishing their control of 
space. Symbolic meanings attached to these spatial settings create entirely new meanings for 
the old rituals that were accomplished within the spatial aura of the mosques and other public 
sites in traditional Islamic cities.
Overall, this system seems to deflate and obscure Islamic authenticity. In other words, 
the virtual city of Tehran subordinates what remains of Islamic traditions, traditional forms, 
and popular ways of life, and transforms them into something new. In his book Hybrid 
Urbanism, Nezar Alsayyad opens up an important genre in contemporary urbanism that 
emerges from multi-identical features. He argues that “whereas identity may respond to the 
temporal pressure for uniformity, hybridity can manifest the spatial dimension of 
multiplicity.” Alsayyad sees globalization as an important factor in the production of a local 
culture and equates hybridity with globalization. (Alsayyad, 2001:16)
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Urban visual culture in post-revolutionary Tehran reached its ultimate implosion during 
the 1980s. In visual terms, it transformed the depth of spaces to surfaces of all kinds—from 
the two-dimensional murals of the Ayatollahs to women’s envelopes. We can understand this 
phenomenon as a reflection of the processes of capitalist culture, a useful technique serving 
in Tehran as clothing for ideological purposes. “The postmodernist trends in the world 
architecture were gaining momentum at about the same time that the Islamic Revolution was 
triumphant in Iran, bringing about two motivations which worked in parallel to launch a new 
period in the architecture of Iran” (Mirmiraan, 1999:45). These two forces together helped to 
create a type of visual culture in Iran which displayed postmodernist tastes and themes, as 
well as elements taken from Islamic ideologies.
Alsayyad argues that globalization has made it difficult to use urban form to understand 
the particular manifestations of human behavior (Alsayyad, 2001:13). He casts doubt on the 
utility of urbanism as an analytical category for representing the cultures of people and places 
(Alsayyad, 2001:13). Viewed from the outside, Tehran might seem to fit into Alsayyad’s 
global/hybrid model. The view from within—from behind the veil, behind the dark shelter of 
a repressed female citizen—reveals Tehran as a patriarchal site, establishing its own local 
hierarchy of power: a site of one, and not the "other."
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